BARGAINING FOR ACCOMMODATIONS
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Accommodations can be essential for the employment of people with
disabilities but these accommodations face a potential conflict with
contractual rights of other employees under a collective bargaining
agreement. In the past fourteen years, courts have expanded upon the
Supreme Court’s deference to contractual rights, making it increasingly
difficult for unionized employees to receive accommodations. The
Supreme Court left room for parties to a collective bargaining agreement to
resolve potential conflicts between accommodations and contractual rights.
This article suggests that parties to a collective bargaining agreement, as
well as employees with disabilities, would benefit from the use of
bargaining to resolve such conflicts.
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INTRODUCTION
People with disabilities often require accommodations to participate in
the labor market. Any medical impairment or even a change in duties, may
prevent an employee from continuing to work without some
accommodation. If that employee is part of a bargaining unit, that
accommodation may appear to infringe on other employees’ rights under
the applicable collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”). Instead of
turning to collective bargaining to resolve such conflicts, employers have
been allowed to deny accommodations for employees with disabilities
based on real or even imagined conflicts with the terms of a CBA.
This potential conflict between an employee’s right to reasonable
accommodation under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the
provisions of a CBA raises questions about duties of employers and unions
to comply with the ADA and their obligation to bargain under the National
Labor Relations Act (NLRA) or public sector labor laws. This paper
examines how bargaining can resolve these conflicts for the benefit of the
employer, the union, and employees with disabilities.
Accommodations are intended to enable a person with a disability to
perform his or her essential job duties,1 providing a way for people with
disabilities to overcome systemic subordination and oppression.2 An
employer must take reasonable steps to accommodate an employee’s
disability unless the accommodation “would impose an undue hardship
on the operation of the business” of the employer.3
Thus,
accommodations can be required to preserve the employee’s status as a
“qualified individual,” while the reasonableness of such accommodations
rests on “the needs and disability of the employee and the resources and
expectations of the employer.”4
Even with this fairly broad duty to accommodate, the ADA has
not fulfilled its promise to “substantially improve[]” the employment
opportunities of persons with disabilities.5 The state of employment for
1. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (2014).
2. Samuel R. Bagenstos, “Rational Discrimination,” Accommodation, and the Politics
of (Disability) Civil Rights, 89 VA. L. REV. 825, 830 (2003).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (b)(5)(A)(2014).
4. Carrie Griffin Basas, Back Rooms, Board Rooms – Reasonable Accommodation and
Resistance under the ADA, 29 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 59, 68 (2008).
5. Scott Burris & Kathryn Moss, The Employment Discrimination Provisions of the
Americans with Disabilities Act: Implementation and Impact, 25 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J.
1, 3 (2007). See also David C. Stapleton, et al., Has the Employment Rate of People with
Disabilities Declined?, CORNELL U. EMP’T & DISABILITY INST. 1 (Dec. 2004), available at
http://www.ilr.cornell.edu/edi/publications/PB_EmpDecline.pdf [https://perma.cc/N5XKXCHR] (stating that the decline in employment for persons with disabilities is real);
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people with disabilities has been described as “at best, precarious.” 6
In 2014, only 17.1% of persons with a disability were employed,7 a
decrease from 21.5% i n 2 0 0 9 , 8 a n d s i g n i f i c a n t l y lower than
the 64.6% rate for those without a disability.9 This exclusion from the labor
market has been characterized as “a significant waste of potential.”10
Accommodations are important to encourage participation of people with
disabilities in the labor market since lack of access to employment often
stems, at least in part, from impairments which limit one’s ability to work.11
Since work is designed for the able-bodied, accommodations are
sometimes necessary to achieve the ADA’s goal of providing equal
opportunity. 12 Although not confirmed by research, this lower
employment rate logically arises from employers’ refusal to provide
accommodations since refusal to hire or discharge is often the result of
refusing to provide an accommodation. Litigation under the ADA may be
insufficient to expand employment opportunities for people with
disabilities, since ADA complaints are rarely successful,13 and complaints
Daron Acemoglu & Joshua D. Angrist, Consequences of Employment Protection? The Case
of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 109 J. POL. ECON. 915, 917 (2001) (discussing the
decline in employment among disabled persons after passage of ADA); Samuel R.
Bagenstos, The Future of Disability Law, 114 YALE L. J. 1, 19–20 (2004) (noting drop in
employment rate for persons with disabilities during the 1990s); Thomas DeLeire, The Wage
and Employment Effects of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 35 J. HUM. RES. 693, 705
(2000) (noting that statistics show ADA led to relative decrease in employment).
6. Carrie Basas, A Collective Good: Disability Diversity as a Value in Public Sector
Collective Bargaining Agreements, 87 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 793, 799, 801 (2013) [hereinafter
Basas, A Collective Good].
7. Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep’t. of Labor, Persons with a Disability: Labor
Force Characteristics – 2015 (June
16, 2015), http://www.bls.gov/news.release/disabl.nr0.htm [https://perma.cc/LS46-45CY].
[hereinafter Bureau of Labor Statistics, Persons with a Disability 2015].
8. Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep’t. of Labor, Persons with a Disability: Labor
Force Characteristics– 2009 (Aug. 25, 2010), http://op.bna.com/dlrcases.nsf/id/mroe88nsrh/$File/ Disabilities%20Employment%202009.pdf [https://perma.cc/YMM6-NPBY].
[hereinafter Bureau of Labor Statistics, Persons with a Disability 2009].
9. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Persons with a Disability, supra note 7.
10. ILO, DISABILITY INCLUSION STRATEGY AND ACTION PLAN, 2014-17 1 (2015),
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/—-ed_emp/—ifp_skills/documents/genericdocument/wcms_370772.pdf [https://perma.cc/R9ZG-MWCJ].
11. Basas, A Collective Good, supra note 6, at 799.
12. See Office of the Architect of the Capitol v. Office of Compliance, 361 F.3d 633,
641-42 (Fed. Cir. 2004)(citing the ACA’s goal of providing equal opportunity as a reason
for mandating employer to provide reasonable accommodation); Helen A. Schartz, et al.,
Workplace Accommodations: Evidence Based Outcomes, 27 WORK 345, 349 (2006)(citing
statistics demonstrating that the ACA allowed employers to provide opportunities to retain
or promote a significant percentage of employees with disabilities by providing
accommodations).
13. Kathryn Moss, Unfunded Mandate: An Empirical Study of the Implementation of
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by applicants who might need accommodations are very rare.14
Rather than relying on litigation, access to the labor market for people
with disabilities can be enhanced through collective bargaining, to fully
realize the ADA’s potential for providing accommodations. Rather than
turning to bargaining to enhance the opportunities of people with
disabilities, a CBA has sometimes created a barrier to providing
accommodations that conflict with the interests or rights of other
employees. Two studies have shown that the coverage of a CBA negatively
affected the probability that an employee would be accommodated, at least
in some ways. One study suggested that seniority provisions in CBAs may
“mitigate against flexibility in work assignment,” and another surmised that
“union membership may be a constraint on the capacity of employers to
make particular types of accommodations.”15
When the ADA was adopted, some saw it as one more extension of
individual rights “signaling and causing the demise of the industrial
pluralist model of collective bargaining.”16 Instead of this either-or
approach, the collective bargaining relationship should be seen as an
opportunity for both employers and unions to fulfill their obligations under
the ADA.
Some early attention was given to the potential conflict between the
ADA and collectively bargained rights.17 In 2000, one study noted that
the Americans with Disabilities Act by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. 50
U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 110 (2001); Ruth Colker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: A
Windfall for Defendants, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 99, 105-08 (1999).
14. In 2015, only 6% of all ADA charges filed concerned hiring. See EEOC Charge
Statistics,
2015,
https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/ada-charges.cfm
[https://perma.cc/TM8W-RUWJ] (documenting the number of charges filed and resolved
under
the
ADA)
and
EEOC,
Statutes
by
Issue,
2015,
https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/statutes_by_issue.cfm
[https://perma.cc/9UBA-5WB2] (categorizing charges of employment discrimination by
statute and type of discrimination).
15. Thomas N. Chirikos, Employer Accommodation of Older Workers with Disabilities
in EMPLOYMENT, DISABILITY AND THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT: ISSUES IN LAW,
PUBLIC POLICY, AND RESEARCH 228, 245 (Peter D. Blanck 2000); Deborah B. Balser,
Predictors of Workplace Accommodation for Employees With Mobility-Related Disabilities,
39 ADMIN. & SOC’Y 656, 672-74 (2007).
16. Richard Bales, Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act: Conflicts between
Reasonable Accommodation and Collective Bargaining, 2 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 161,
164 (1992-93). See also Katherine Van Wezel Stone, The Legacy of Industrial Pluralism:
The Tension Between Individual Employment Rights and the New Deal Collective
Bargaining System, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 575, 578-79 (1992) (overlapping systems endanger
both collective and individual rights).
17. See, e.g., Ann C. Hodges, The Americans with Disabilities Act in the Unionized
Workplace, 48 U. MIAMI L. REV. 567, 569, 616-17 (1994) [hereinafter Hodges, The
Americans with Disabilities Act] (discussing tensions that may arise between the ADA and
collective bargaining agreements); Ann C. Hodges, Protecting Unionized Employees
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unions were often involved in discussions about potential accommodations
for employees with disabilities, but even then, only 45% were involved in
grievance proceedings related to accommodations.18 Since then, little or no
research has considered the role of unions and collective bargaining in the
provision of accommodations for employees with disabilities.19 Lareau’s
guidance on drafting union contracts dedicates five pages to an explanation
of the ADA, but fails to even mention the possibility that the parties could
negotiate to lessen the ambiguities and potential conflicts that can arise
under the ADA.20
Despite these early concerns, a CBA need not inhibit the provision of
accommodations. Rather, judicial interpretation of the ADA’s duty to
accommodate leaves ample room for an employer and union to bargain
about accommodations. In 2002, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a
transfer as an accommodation may be unreasonable because of seniority
rights of another employee under an employer’s policy.21 The Court was
concerned particularly with protecting the established rights of other
employees that preexisted the request for an accommodation.22 Despite this
respect for the rights of other employees, this decision also provides that an
accommodation may be reasonable if it does not overly infringe on the
rights of other employees or does not directly conflict with a contractual
right.
The Supreme Court’s decision did not concern a CBA, but both
employers and courts have relied on this decision to avoid requiring an
accommodation which allegedly conflicts with a CBA.23 Both lower courts
and the parties to CBAs have deferred to the Supreme Court’s 2002
determination that collectively bargained rights typically prevail over
conflicting requests for accommodation. This paper examines the courts’
decisions that have applied the Supreme Court’s decision and then
discusses the potential for a greater role of collective bargaining in

Against Discrimination: The Fourth Circuit’s Misinterpretation of Supreme Court
Precedent, 2 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 123, 151 (1998) [hereinafter Hodges, Protecting
Unionized Employees] (citing a case in which the Supreme Court considered the tension
between the ADA and collective bargaining agreements).
18. Susanne M. Bruyere, Disability Employment Policies and Practices in Private and
Federal Sector Organizations, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, School of Industrial and
Labor Relations Extension Division, Program on Employment and Disability (2000).
19. Lisa Schur, et al., Corporate Culture and the Employment of Persons with
Disabilities, 23 BEHAV. SCI. & THE L. 3, 14 (2005).
20. N. PETER LAREAU, DRAFTING THE UNION CONTRACT: A HANDBOOK FOR THE
MANAGEMENT NEGOTIATOR §5A.10 (2008).
21. U.S. Airways v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 404 (2002).
22. Id. at 405.
23. Id. at 404.
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providing accommodations for the benefit of the employer, union, and
employees with disabilities.
Bargaining over accommodations can be beneficial for employers,
unions, and employees with disabilities. Employers can hire and retain
valuable employees with disabilities by collaborating with the union to find
accommodations that best fit their work environment.24 The negotiation
process itself can promote access to accommodations which are least
disruptive to the workplace and earn the acceptance of co-workers.25 Such
collaboration can help employers avoid both litigation under the ADA and
contractual claims from other affected employees. By engaging in this
process, unions can establish their value to their membership while limiting
the employer’s discretion in making determinations about
accommodations.26 For employees with disabilities, negotiation enhances
the ADA’s obligation to accommodate by directing a union’s resources to
address the barriers to their success in the workplace.27 Thus, bargaining
over accommodations can help to expand access to the labor market for
people with disabilities while still allowing an employer and union to
confer over terms and conditions of employment in that workplace.
I.

“CONFLICTING” OBLIGATIONS UNDER ADA & NLRA

Employers and unions must uphold the nondiscrimination provisions
of the ADA, including the duty to provide reasonable accommodations.
Reasonable accommodations can include shift changes, reassignment of
nonessential duties, leave, and even transfer to another position, all of
which can come into conflict with negotiated rights under a CBA.28 At the
same time, the NLRA obligates both employers and unions to fulfill their
mutual obligations to bargain in good faith over changes in terms and
conditions of employment, which can include the changes sought as
accommodations.29 While these obligations have been characterized as
potentially conflicting, they can also be seen as an opportunity to fully
address the purposes of the ADA’s duty to accommodate.
24. See notes 249-269 and accompanying text for discussion of the benefits to
employers.
25. Id.
26. See notes 270-327 and accompanying text for discussion of benefits to unions.
27. See notes 328-358 and accompanying text for discussion of benefits to employees
with disabilities.
28. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(2014).
29. Judith Fornalik, Reasonable Accommodations and Collective Bargaining
Agreements: A Continuing Dispute, 31 U. TOL. L. REV. 117, 127 (1999-2000); William J.
McDevitt, Seniority Systems and the Americans with Disabilities Act: The Fate of
“Reasonable Accommodation” After Eckles, 9 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 359, 373 (1997).
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A. Shared Duty to Accommodate under ADA
Both employers and unions can be held responsible for a violation of
the ADA, including the failure to provide reasonable accommodations.30
Where the parties to a CBA fail to resolve an accommodation issue to the
satisfaction of the employee with a disability, both the employer and union
have been joined as defendants in failure to accommodate claims.31 Given
these obligations under the ADA, it is important to understand the role of a
CBA in defining the scope of reasonable accommodations.
ADA’s prohibition against discrimination extends to a “contractual or
other arrangement or relationship which has the effect of subjecting a
covered entity’s qualified applicant or employee with a disability to
discrimination,” including the relationship with a labor union.32 This
prohibition applies to a CBA which could disproportionately exclude or
hinder the opportunities of persons with disabilities,33 unless that policy
serves some business necessity.34 For example, a CBA could not define
job duties so broadly as to exclude people with disabilities from holding
that position.35 Arguably, then, a union’s duties under the ADA include
“either modifying a contract with discriminatory effects or waiving
compliance with contractual provisions that cause discrimination.”36
Keeping in mind this prohibition against contractual terms with a
30. Robert W. Pritchard, Avoiding the Inevitable: Resolving the Conflicts Between the
ADA and the NLRA, 11 THE LAB. LAWY. 375, 381 (1996). Unions are covered entitles
under ADA. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(2) (1994) (stating that a labor organization is a covered
entity under the ADA); see also Joanne J. Ervin, Reasonable Accommodation and the
Collective Bargaining Agreement Under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 1991
DET. C.L. REV. 925, 956-58 (1991) (distinguishing key differences between the ADA, which
treats all covered entities identically, and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which places the
duty to accommodate on the employer alone).
31. Pritchard, supra note 30, at 375.
32. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(2)(2014).
33. Hodges, The Americans with Disabilities Act, supra note 17, at 586-88.
34. EEOC Interpretive Guidance on Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act
(“EEOC Guidance”), C.F.R. § 1630.4(2) (App) (“Employers can continue to use criteria
that are job related and consistent with business necessity to select qualified employees”).
See also Mary K. O’Melveny, The Americans with Disabilities Act and Collective
Bargaining Agreements: Reasonable Accommodations or Irreconcilable Conflicts? 82 KY.
L.J. 219, 241 (1994) (explaining that the ADA is not intended to limit an employer’s ability
to maintain a qualified workforce); Condon A. McGlothlen and Gary N. Savine,
Symposium: Individual Rights and Reasonable Accommodations under the Americans with
Disabilities Act: Eckles v. Consolidated Rail Corp.: Reconciling the ADA with collective
bargaining agreements: Is this the correct approach? 46 DEPAUL L. REV. 1043, 1044
(1997).
35. See, e.g., Lujan v. Pacific Maritime Association, 163 F.3d 738, 742 (9th Cir. 1999).
36. Hodges, The Americans with Disabilities Act, supra note 17, at 586-88.
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disparate impact without a business necessity, the legislative history of
the ADA suggests that the terms of a CBA can help define the limits of
reasonable accommodation. Rights created under a collective bargaining
agreement may factor into determining whether a particular
accommodation is reasonable; e.g., a seniority provision may factor into
determining whether it is reasonable to reassign a disabled employee
without the required seniority to a position.37 Both the Senate and House
cautioned that a CBA cannot alone justify a refusal to accommodate based
on an arguably inconsistent CBA term.38 This guidance, while described as
“ambiguous,” suggests the legislature intended that the duty to
accommodate would outweigh conflicting contractual duties.39
Despite some ambiguity, the ADA’s legislative history does not
support giving absolute deference to seniority systems that conflict
with an accommodation request. Unlike Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act or the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the ADA does not include any
special status for seniority or any other collectively bargained rights.40
This omission indicates that Congress did not intend to provide any
special treatment for seniority unlike that provided under Title VII.41
If CBA language is not dispositive, how should employers and
unions resolve conflicts between CBA language and an accommodation?
The ADA’s House Report and the Equal Employment Opportunity
37. S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 132 (1989) reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 314; H.R.
REP. NO. 101-485 at 63 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 314. See also John W.
Boyle, Comment, The Error of Eckles: Why Seniority Rights Present an Undue Hardship
for Employees with Disabilities, 35 DUQ. L. REV. 1023, 1034 (1997) (explaining that a
seniority provision in a collective bargaining agreement may factor into determining
whether it is reasonable to reassign a disabled employee without the required seniority to the
position); McDevitt, supra note 29, at 373 (explaining that an employer cannot rely on CBA
as an excuse for refusing accommodation).
38. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.6 (b) (1993). See also 34 C.F.R. § 104.11(c) (1993) (“A
recipient’s obligation to comply with this subpart is not affected by any inconsistent term of
any collective bargaining agreement to which it is a party”); Eric H. J. Stahlhut, Playing the
Trump Card: May an Employer Refuse to Reasonably Accommodate under the ADA by
Claiming a Collective Bargaining Obligation?, 9 THE LAB. LAW. 71, 74, 90-91 (1993)
(describing reasonable accommodation provision are to be construed more broadly than
under Title VII or the ADEA; accommodation is “crucial vehicle by which the rights of the
disabled are protected”).
39. Pritchard, supra note 30, at 394; Stahlhut, supra note 38, at 88 (noting the absence
of statutory protection for seniority shows Congressional rejection of deference to seniority
given under Rehabilitation Act). See also Rose Daly-Rooney, Note, Reconciling Conflicts
Between the Americans with Disabilities Act and the National Labor Relations Act to
Accommodate People With Disabilities, 6 DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 387, 401, 403 (1994)
(highlighting that Congress chose not to incorporate express provision exemption for rights
under seniority systems).
40. Fornalik, supra note 29, at 132-33.
41. Ervin, supra note 30, at 961-62.
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Commission’s (EEOC) enforcement manual suggest that CBAs could
allow an employer “to take all actions necessary to comply with [the
ADA]”.42 This approach would allow an employer to provide an
accommodation even if it conflicts with a CBA.43
Some characterize giving employers discretion to allow
accommodations that could conflict with a CBA as “a poor and problemridden substitute for an ongoing dialogue between all of the parties affected
by an ADA accommodation request.”44 Instead, the collective bargaining
process can maximize the effectiveness of the ADA.45 As one expert noted
even before the ADA came into effect, “where the union secures a set of
rights through bargaining, it should have the primary responsibility for
sorting out those rights if a conflict arises.”46 The ADA’s legislative
history supports this idea and promotes an “individualized and contextual
approach to determining disability accommodations” through a
“compromise model...balancing seniority rights and disability
accommodation.”47
Likewise, both the EEOC and the NLRB have suggested that parties
to a CBA can negotiate modifications when the CBA appears to conflict
with the proposed accommodation.48 The parties to a CBA can address
requests for accommodation on a “case-by-case basis,” since both are
covered entities under the ADA, and therefore should meet to resolve
accommodation requests.49 Some have criticized this guidance for not
explicitly stating which statutory right should prevail when the parties

42. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N 68. See also
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Technical Assistance Manual, 6, §§ 3.9, 7.1
l(a), 8 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 405:7007, 405:7050 (suggesting employers seek a provision in
agreements to permit employers to take all actions to comply with the ADA).
43. Hodges, The Americans with Disabilities Act, supra note 17, at 573.
44. O’Melveny, supra note 34, at 235.
45. Id. at 221.
46. Robert J. Rabin, The Role of Unions in the Rights-Based Workplace, 25 USF L.
REV. 169, 197 (1991).
47. Ravi A. Malhatra, The Duty to Accommodate Unionized Workers with Disabilities
in Canada and the United States: A Counter-Hegemonic Approach, 2 J. OF LAW &
EQUALITY 92, 125-26 (2003).
48. See Michael Ervin, Seventh Circuit Ponders Limits of ADA When Act Conflicts With
Union Contract, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), Apr. 9, 1996 (noting that an attorney from the
EEOC argued unions and management should be required to negotiate a variance to
agreements in which seniority interferes with accommodations); EEOC Technical
Assistance Manual, supra note 42, § 3.9(5). See also Robert A. Dubault, Note, The ADA
and the NLRA: Balancing Individual and Collective Rights, 70 IND. L.J. 1271, 1282 (1995)
(stating that unions should be included in discussions regarding grievance related
accommodations).
49. Fornalik, supra note 29, at 136.
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cannot agree to an accommodation,50 thus ignoring the employer’s ability
to implement changes once the parties have reached an impasse.
This more collaborative approach is based on the hope that unions and
employers will bargain to resolve potential conflicts between the ADA and
collective bargaining agreements.51 As outlined below, through bargaining,
unions can “balance the right of the disabled employee under the ADA to
the accommodation against the expectative interests and rights of the other
bargaining unit members.”52 Some assert that bargaining over
accommodations could put an undue burden on the employer, since
employers’ need to comply with the ADA could force bargaining
concessions on other issues to obtain the union’s consent to
accommodations.53 However, since the union has a corresponding
obligation to avoid discrimination under the ADA, the pressure to find a
solution would not be on the employer alone.
B. Duty to Bargain under the NLRA
Just as both parties to a CBA cannot discriminate under the ADA,
both employers and unions are obligated to bargain in good faith under
Sections 8(a)(5) and 8(b)(3) of the NLRA.54 This duty extends to
bargaining over any accommodation which “materially, substantially or
significantly” affects terms and conditions of employment.55 Since the
determination of accommodation reasonableness should be made on a caseby-case basis, “an employer has sufficient discretion under the ADA to
warrant requiring it to afford a union notice and an opportunity to bargain

50. Boyle, supra note 37, at 1025, 1040-41.
51. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 101-485 at 63 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
303, 345 (“[C]onflicts between provisions of a collective bargaining agreement and an
employer’s duty to provide reasonable accommodation may be avoided by ensuring that
agreements negotiated after the effective date of this title contain a provision permitting the
employer to take all actions necessary to comply with this legislation.”); Eckles, 94 F.3d at
1051 (indicating that the EEOC read an actual duty into the ADA that employers and unions
must negotiate a variance from seniority provisions). See also Boyle, supra note 37, at 1039
(“Both the EEOC and Congress had hoped that unions and employers would resolve
potential conflicts between the ADA and collective bargaining agreements through waiver
provisions in subsequent agreements.”).
52. McDevitt, supra note 29, at 377.
53. Bales, supra note 16, at 184.
54. 29 U.S.C. § 158 (a)(5), (b)(3).
55. McDevitt, supra note 29, at 374-75. See also Fornalik, supra note 29, at 135
(explaining that if an employee needs an accommodation that will not materially,
substantially or significantly alter working conditions, the employer has a duty to provide
the accommodation).
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about a proposed accommodation.”56 If the union refuses to bargain or the
parties bargain to impasse,57 then the employer can implement new terms
and conditions of employment unilaterally.58
Nondiscrimination provisions have long been categorized as
mandatory subjects of bargaining, so any proposals to implement or change
such a provision must be bargained to the point of agreement or impasse
before implementation.59 Thus, parties have a duty to bargain in good faith
over the elimination of discrimination in the workplace.60 For example, an
employer may violate its duty to bargain in good faith by insisting on a
nondiscrimination clause which would “prevent the union from fulfilling its
duty of fair representation and exposethe union to legal liabilities” under
nondiscrimination statutes.61 As the result of such bargaining, general
prohibitions against discrimination are commonly included in CBAs.62
Incorporation of the ADA specifically has been less common, but even in
1995, 49 of 400 sample CBAs included a provision promising compliance
with the ADA.63
In the context of racially discriminatory practices, one court upholding
an order for an employer to bargain over specific discriminatory practices
noted that agreement to a general nondiscrimination clause means “little if
the company would not also work to correct individual grievances.”64
56. Jerry M. Hunter, NLRB General Counsel’s Memorandum to Field Personnel on
Potential Conflicts Raised by the Americans with Disabilities Act, 158 DAILY LAB. REP.
(BNA) at *2 (1992). See also O’Melveny, supra note 34, at 243.
57. See Hi-Way Billboards, Inc., 206 N.L.R.B. 22, 23 (1973) (establishing the
definition of impasse as deadlock following bargaining in good faith).
58. TruServ Corp. v. NLRB, 254 F.3d 1105, 1113 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
59. See Emporium Capwell Co. v. W. Addition Cmty. Org., 420 U.S. 50, 69 (1975)
(highlighting that elimination of discrimination and its vestiges is an appropriate subject of
bargaining); see also IUERMW v. NRLB, 648 F.2d 18, 25 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (affirming the
elimination of discrimination and its vestiges is an appropriate subject of bargaining);
Farmers’ Coop. Compress, 169 N.L.R.B. 290, 295 (1968) (discussing a case where
employer violated section 8(a)(5) by failing to bargain meaningfully over elimination of
discrimination in the plant), aff’d sub nom. United Packinghouse Workers Int’l Union v.
NLRB, 416 F.2d 1126, 1133 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
60. Farmers’ Coop. Compress, 169 N.L.R.B. at 295.
61. Graphic Arts Int’l Union, 235 NLRB 1084, 1084 (1978).
62. See Lareau, supra note 20, § 5A-10 (“It has been estimated that 94% of all
collective bargaining agreements contain a non-discrimination clause.”). See also Bureau of
Nat’l Affairs, Inc., BASIC PATTERNS IN UNION CONTRACTS 127 (BNA Books 14th ed.
1995) [hereinafter BNA, Basic Patterns] (reporting that in 1995, 87% of CBAs banned
discrimination based on face, color, creed, sex, national origin or age, and 65% extended
prohibition to at least one of: political affiliation, marital status, mental or physical
handicap, Vietnam veteran, sexual preference).
63. BNA, Basic Patterns, supra note 57, at 128.
64. United Packinghouse, Food & Allied Workers Int’l Union v. NLRB, 416 F.2d 1126,
1132-33 n. 10(D.C. Cir. 1969).
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Bargaining allows the union to have input “to ensure that the employee’s
rights are protected and to reduce the chance for conflict.”65
Under this approach, any changes to policies concerning terms and
conditions of employment which allow for accommodations would
constitute mandatory subjects of bargaining. Additionally, an individual
request for an accommodation could create an obligation to bargain if it
would require a material, substantial or significant change in working
conditions for the employee seeking the accommodation or co-workers
who are affected by that accommodation.66 For example, an employer was
obligated to bargain over a request for a permanent day shift assignment as
an accommodation.67
Some accommodations may not create a corresponding duty to
bargain if there is no effect on terms or conditions of employment. For
example, employees would not be required to bargain over
accommodations which allow the employee to perform the same job in a
different way or allow for performance of nonessential duties by a
supervisor; neither of these changes would infringe on any expectations of
bargaining unit members.68 Similarly, some accommodations can be seen
as variations in the employer-employee relationship which do not alter that
relationship,69 such as telework or using alternative means of
communication.
Like changes that do not affect terms or conditions of employment,
accommodations that do not give an employee with a disability an

65. O’Melveny, supra note 34, at 229. See also Hunter, supra note 56, at 2 (quoting
“employer that arranges a reasonable accommodation with an employee which would
change working conditions without negotiating with the affected union may be liable for
‘direct dealing’ with the employee [in violation of the NLRA]”).
66. Hodges, The Americans with Disabilities Act, supra note 17, at 569, 616-17. See
also Seth D. Harris, Re-Thinking the Economics of Discrimination: U.S. Airways v. Barnett,
the ADA, and the Application of Internal Labor Market Theory, 89 IOWA L. REV. 123, 136
(2003) (explaining that employers are obligated to obey CBA or bargain for its
modification); Brian P. Kavanaugh, Collective Bargaining Agreements and the Americans
with Disabilities Act: A Problematic Limitation on “Reasonable Accommodation” for the
Union Employee, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 751, 761 (1999) (explaining that the ADA grants
bargaining power to the union in instances where accommodations made for an employee
require job reassignment or circumventing seniority provisions).
67. Industria Lechera De Puerto Rico, Inc. and Congresso De Uniones Industriales De
Puerto Rico, 344 NLRB No. 133 (2005).
68. Hunter, supra note 56, at 2; Pritchard, supra note 30, at 389 (noting an employer
can unilaterally implement changes in working conditions if changes are not material,
substantial or significant).
69. Nicole Buonocore Porter, Martinizing Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act,
47 GA. L. REV. 527, 568-70, 73 (2013) [hereinafter Porter, Martinizing Title I] (borrowing
fundamental alternation of relationship rule from Martin v. PGA).
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advantage over his or her co-workers do not require bargaining.70 Arguably
this would include providing an employee with a transfer to a position for
which he or she lacks the requisite seniority, where the only alternative is
discharge, since such a transfer would not give that employee an unfair
competitive advantage.71
Neither party has any obligation to bargain regarding a mandatory
subject of bargaining, such as an accommodation, during the term of a
CBA,72 since neither party is obligated to consent to the modification of a
current CBA unless it includes an agreement to do so.73 At the same time,
the parties can facilitate the accommodation process by agreeing to a
procedure for considering accommodation requests, including a reopener
clause in the CBA to allow midterm negotiations over such requests.74
Agreement to such a process would decrease the potential for failure to
negotiate claims or for violation of a CBA if a request for an
accommodation is made.
II.

DEFERENCE TO CBA’S IN THE COURTS

The ADA provides an affirmative right to r e a s o n a b l e
accommodations t h a t do not impose an undue hardship on the
employer. 75 The Supreme Court has recognized that accommodation
sometimes requires differential treatment.76 While some characterize
employers as “reasonably responsive” to employees’ requests for
accommodation,77 employers may feel less inclined or even prohibited from
providing an accommodation which conflicts with provisions of a CBA.
Both the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts generally have
resolved this potentially conflicting obligation by allowing deference to the
terms of a CBA at the cost of the employee with a disability. The courts
have failed to recognize the potential for parties to a CBA to incorporate
their duty to accommodate into their CBA to avoid such conflicts, or to
70. Id. at 570, 573.
71. Id. at 575-76.
72. Pritchard, supra note 30, at 412.
73. See, e.g., Boeing Co., 337 NLRB 758 (2002) (holding the respondent did not fail to
bargain in good faith with the Union regarding compensation and benefit plans to cover
affected employees because in the absence of a provision in the contract, parties have no
obligation to bargain during mid-term of an agreement).
74. Dubault, supra note 48, at 1280-81.
75. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5). See also Harris, supra note 66, at 144 (noting that
plaintiffs have the low-bar burden of proving their accommodation is reasonable in court).
76. Barnett, 535 U.S. at 397.
77. Sharona Hoffman, Settling the Matter: Does Title I of the ADA Work?, 59 ALA. L.
REV. 305, 307 (2008).
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bargain over individual accommodation requests so as to resolve any such
conflict.
A. Supreme Court and Accommodations
In its 2002 decision, the Supreme Court found that an employer’s
seniority policy is relevant but not conclusive as to whether a transfer would
be a reasonable accommodation when another employee seeks that position
based on their seniority.78 The Supreme Court has not directly addressed the
conflict between an employer’s obligation to accommodate under the ADA and
its obligations under a CBA. Yet this decision has been relied upon by lower
courts in deferring to policies in a CBA to justify the denial of an
accommodation.79
The Barnett Court explained that an employer’s seniority policy generally
was entitled to deference based on “the importance of seniority to employeemanagement relations,” 80 which includes fulfillment of employee
expectations of fair, uniform treatment. 81 At the same time, the Supreme
Court recognized that where a policy has included either formal or
informal exceptions, an employer cannot rely on a strict interpretation
of that policy to deny an accommodation.82 If these exceptions, or
“special circumstances” are built into a policy, then co-workers of the
employee requesting an accommodation do not have pre-existing
expectations worthy of such deference.83 Thus, if the CBA clearly
provides for accommodations as exceptions to a seniority policy or
some other contractual provision, then employees’ expectations will
not be violated by provision of accommodations without consideration
of the seniority of the person with a disability.
The Court’s decision recognizes that under a seniority system, coworkers of employees seeking accommodation “have rights and interests
that are both legitimate and significant.”84 In general, seniority systems
78. Barnett, 535 U.S. at 397.
79. See, e.g., Manigan v. Southwest Ohio Reg’l Transit Auth., 385 F. App’x 472, 477
(6th Cir. 2010) (noting shifts can be assigned based on seniority under the CBA).
80. Barnett, at 403.
81. Harris, supra note 66, at 171.
82. Barnett, at 405.
83. Id.
84. Lisa E. Key, Co-Worker Morale, Confidentiality, and the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 46 DEPAUL L. REV. 1003, 1013, 1033, 1039 (1997). See also Agnieszka
Kosny, et al., Buddies in Bad Times? The Role of Co-Workers after a Work-Related Injury,
23 J. OCCUPATIONAL REHAB. 438, 439 (2013) (finding that co-workers may resent
employees with limitations if their workload increases or the employee is provided with
easier work); Debra A. Dunstan & Ellen MacEachen, Bearing the Brunt: Co-workers’
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have been characterized as “the employer’s sunk investments/delayed
dividends contract with its employees.”85 In CBAs, seniority provisions are
often adopted because employers and unions perceive various benefits,
including more efficient administration and the avoidance of claims of
favoritism and discrimination in personnel actions, such as layoffs,
transfers, and shift assignments.86 Despite this important role of seniority
in CBAs, it is important to recognize that the rights associated with
seniority are a product of contract negotiation. If the parties to a CBA
decide to create exceptions for accommodations in the CBA’s seniority
policy, or any other provision, then that intention of the parties should be
enforced.
The Barnett Court’s deference to an employer’s seniority policy
should not prevent or even discourage bargaining over CBA
provisions which could conflict with a requested accommodation.
Under the Court’s reasoning, parties to a CBA can negotiate
exceptions to general policies to fulfill their obligation to
accommodate under the ADA. The Court gave deference to an
employer’s unilaterally implemented policy. A CBA is an agreement
between an employer and a union that has the authority to represent
the members of its bargaining unit. With this authority, a union can
agree at any time to renegotiate the terms and conditions of
employment encompassed in the CBA or not addressed therein.
Even if the parties have not negotiated exceptions to a policy in a
CBA, negotiation regarding an individual request for accommodation
can still resolve a conflict that arises. Rights created by a CBA are
dependent on the continuation and enforceability of that CBA.87
Employees represented by a union are always on notice that their
rights can change according to the priorities established by their union
representative.88 Thus, one can also conculude that a union is
empowered to negotiate changes or exceptions to a policy or practice
Experiences of Work Reintegration Processes, 23 J. OCCUPATIONAL REHAB. 44 (2013)
(noting that an employee who is accommodated can have a ripple effect on satisfaction of
co-workers); Hodges, The Americans with Disabilities Act, supra note 17, at 601-02
(observing that decisions under Title VII and Rehabilitation Act ruled in favor of enforcing
seniority and focused on protecting expectations of other employees).
85. Harris, supra note 66, at 126.
86. Daly-Rooney, supra note 39, at 407. See also Matthew A. Shapiro, Lab. Goals and
Antidiscrimination Norms: Employer Discretion, Reasonable Accommodation, and the
Costs of Individualized Treatment, 32 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 14, 30 (2013) (stating that
seniority systems protect against “personal retaliation or preference”).
87. Douglas E. Ray, et al., Understanding Labor Law 289-90 (Lexis Nexis 4th Edition
2014).
88. Id. at 355.
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which conflicts with an accommodation request. Acceptance of such an
exception can be based on the union’s recognition that the economic
interests and rights of co-workers, such as under a seniority policy, may be
overridden to advance an important social policy, like accommodation
under the ADA.89 For example, exceptions to a seniority provision of a
CBA can be justified by the fact that absent past discrimination or the need
to take leave because of their impairment, many more people with
disabilities would have been in the workforce earning seniority.90
The reasoning of the Barnett Court still allows parties to a CBA to
structure its provisions so as to allow for preservation of rights and
privileges such as those based on seniority, while still allowing the parties
to negotiate regarding the provision of reasonable accommodations. The
CBA itself can be structured so as to recognize the duty to accommodate
alongside other CBA rights, so that an accommodation would not in fact
conflict with the CBA provision and therefore would not undermine the
expectations of other employees. Secondly, if the parties engage in
negotiations over requests for accommodations as part of the interactive
process required by the ADA, that process can result in exceptions to the
general CBA provisions.
Under Barnett’s exception for special
circumstances, the parties to the CBA could then interact with the
employee with a disability to ensure that his or her ADA rights are
protected while still considering the interests of his or her co-workers.
B. Lower Courts Balancing of Accommodations vs. Contractual
Rights
Lower courts have interpreted Barnett to address conflicts between
an accommodation and CBA provisions, as well as employer policies.
Many of these lower courts have applied Barnett broadly, finding that
employers need not provide an accommodation which contradicts
provisions of a CBA or any other non-discriminatory policy.91 These
attempts to interpret and apply the Barnett decision fail to recognize the
important role of collective bargaining in the consideration of
accommodation requests.
Since Barnett concerned a non-union operation, the undue hardship
89. Kymberly D. Hankinson, Commentary, Navigating Between a Rock and a Hard
Place: An Employer’s Obligation to Reasonably Accommodate the Disabled in the
Unionized Workplace, 15 J. OF CONTEMP. HEALTH LAW & POL’Y 245, 259 (1999).
90. Daly-Rooney, supra note 39, at 411; Harris, supra note 66, at 128, 135.
91. See, e.g., Hedrick v. W. Reserve Care Sys., 355 F.3d 444, 457 (6th Cir. 2004)
(noting that an employer need not, “violate other employees’ rights under a collective
bargaining agreement . . . in order to accommodate a disabled individual”).
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only concerned the employer’s own policy. Since that decision, its
reasoning has been applied to unionized workplaces, giving deference to
policies encapsulated in a CBA. Even though the union has obvious
interests at stake in the adherence to a CBA’s provisions, courts have
focused on the potential that an accommodation in conflict with a CBA’s
provisions would cause undue hardship to the employer only.92 This
assumes that the employer has a distinct interest in the enforcement of the
CBA.
Interpreting Barnett broadly, courts typically have not required an
employer to provide any accommodation that contravenes a seniority
provision.93 Virtually all CBAs include seniority provisions,94 which
92. See, e.g., Roberts v. Kaiser Found. Hospital, No. 2:12-cv-2506-CKD, 2015 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 16169 at *19 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 10, 2015) (noting that the ADA requires
reasonable accommodation to be provided “unless [the employer] can demonstrate that the
accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the business of [the
employer]”).
93. Denczak v. Ford Motor Co., 215 Fed. Appx. 442, 445-46 (6th Cir. 2007) (noting
that the position plaintiff sought was filled based on seniority and the ADA did not require
the employer “to displace existing employees from their positions”); Dunderdale v. United
Airlines, 807 F.3d 849, 855-6 (7th Cir. 2015) (finding no special circumstances existed
where employer had applied seniority bidding system consistently); Toland v. AT&T,
Bellsouth Telecomm. Inc., 489 Fed. Appx. 318, 320 n. 7 (11th Cir. 2012) (noting an
employer does not have to breach seniority to accommodate a disabled employee);
Manigan, 385 Fed. Appx. at 477 (6th Cir. 2010) (noting that shifts were assigned based on
seniority under the CBA); Toronka v. Cont’l Airlines Inc., 411 Fed. Appx. 719, 725 (5th
Cir. 2011) (noting that plaintiff lacked seniority for shift of position he could perform);
Toland v. AT&T, Bellsouth Telecomm. Inc., 489 Fed. Appx. 318, 320 n. 7 (11th Cir.
2012) (noting an employer does not have to breach seniority to accommodate a disabled
employee); King v. City of Madison, 550 F.3d 598, 600 (7th Cir. 2008) (finding that plaintiff
lacked seniority to bump others in her bargaining unit); Ceska v. City of Chi., No. 13 C
6403, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12318 *11-12(N.D. Ill. Feb. 3, 2015) (finding that plaintiff
failed to present any special circumstances to justify transfer without seniority); Daughtry v.
Army Fleet Support, LLC, 925 F. Supp. 2d 1277, 1283 (M.D. Ala. 2013) (determining that
the position sought by plaintiff was filled by others with more seniority); Boitnott v.
Corning Inc., No. 7:06-CV-00330, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59269 at *33-34 (W.D. Va. June
15, 2010), aff’d on other grounds, 669 F.3d 172(4th Cir. 2012) (determining that employer
did not need to change shifts assigned based on seniority); Herr v. City Of Chi., 479 F.
Supp. 2d 834, 840 (N.D. Ill. 2007) (finding plaintiff was not excluded from the position
because he lacked the seniority to be given day shift under the CBA); Fiumara v. President
and Fellows of Harvard College, 526 F. Supp. 2d 150, 157 (D. Mass. 2007) (finding that
plaintiff was not eligible for the position because it was given to a senior qualified bidder
under CBA); Thomson v. Henderson, Postmaster Gen., NO. 3:02CV-224-S, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 12979 at *17 (W.D. Ky. March 21, 2006), aff’d by Thompson v. Henderson, 226
Fed. Appx. 466 (6th Cir. 2007) (ruling that a CBA which required that the employee be a
senior bidder to transfer into permanent position was a legitimate job process); Desmond v.
Gober, No. 00-6261, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51395 at *19 (D. N.J. July 27, 2006)
(determining that the accommodations plaintiff demanded were not provided under
employer’s seniority system); Adams v. TRW Auto. U.S. LLC, No. 3:03-1240 2005 U.S.
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often play a role in promotions and transfers as well as the recall rights of
laid off employees.95 Given their commonality, this deference to seniority
has a significant negative impact on requests for accommodations which
arguably conflict with such a policy, including the opportunity to
transfer.96 Consequently, the claims of numerous employees with a
disability have been dismissed because the employee sought a transfer
into a position to which another employee claimed rights under a CBA.
The broad application of Barnett since 2002 has resulted in the
discharge of many employees with disabilities. This deference to CBA
provisions has been expanded beyond seniority to bar claims of
employees who seek accommodations which limit an employer’s
authority or discretion which has been retained under a CBA or its own
policy.97 For example, the claim of a post office employee seeking
assignment to a particular shift was dismissed based on that employer’s
retention of authority to assign employees to any shift under the CBA.98
The court concluded that the accommodation would “violate” the CBA,99
when in fact the accommodation was within the employer’s discretion
allowed under the CBA.
Similarly, such deference has been paid to contractual clauses giving
recall or transfer preference to laid off employees.100 These limitations
have justified an employer’s failure to provide an accommodation even
where there was no apparent effect on the rights or interests of other
employees. In one case, an employee’s request to transfer to other facilities
where work that he could perform was available was deemed unreasonable,
Dist. LEXIS 39636 at *54-60 (M.D. Tenn. July 22, 2005) (determining that the position
plaintiff sought as accommodation was filled by person with greater seniority); Rodgers v.
Norfolk S. Corp., 304 F. Supp. 2d 961, 970 (S.D. Ohio 2003) (observing that plaintiff
lacked seniority to transfer into a position she could perform).
94. Kavanaugh, supra note 66, at 771. See also Malhatra, supra note 47, at 123 (noting
that an “overwhelming majority of collective agreements” contain a seniority provision).
95. BNA, Basic Patterns, supra note 57 at 85-87.
96. Id. (CBAs between Big Bear Stores Co. and Multiunion (so far as is practicable),
Jacobs Vehicle Equipment Co. and Auto Workers, Smith Meter Inc. and Auto Workers,
Elliott Turbo Machinery Co. and Steelworkers). Id. at 87. (Transfer requests consider
seniority under 57% of CBAs, including 8% where seniority is sole factor, 54% as the
determining factor among qualified applicants, and a secondary factor in 28%.)
97. See, e.g., Mattingly v. Univ. of S. Fla. Bd. of Tr., 931 F. Supp. 2d 1176, 1185-86
(M.D. Fla. 2013) (noting an employer is not required to allow an employee with disability to
work a shorter shift than required by the employer’s shift policy or to transfer into different
position without “permanent status” as required by CBA).
98. Runkle v. Potter, 271 F. Supp. 2d 951, 952 (E.D. Mich. 2003).
99. Id. See also Murray v. AT&T Mobility LLC, No. 08-3159, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
84117 at *43 (C.D. Ill. Sept. 15, 2009) (failing to explain how use of vacation time provided
by a CBA would impede the rights of other employees).
100. Kempter v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 534 Fed. Appx. 487, 492 (6th Cir. 2013).
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based on the limitations in the CBA that only allowed transfers for current
or laid-off employees, thereby excluding the plaintiff because he was not
currently working due to his disability.101 This claim was dismissed
without any showing that considering him for those positions would have
imposed any undue hardship on the employer or infringed on the rights of
other employees.102
Broad applications of Barnett have extended to allow the denial of
an accommodation based on restrictions or procedures established in a
CBA, even without any demonstrated impact on the rights of other
employees. For example, a request for meal breaks by an employee with a
disability was deemed unreasonable because the applicable CBA provided
that employees in that position were not allowed a mealtime break,103
without any showing that his taking of breaks would cause any undue
hardship for the employer or infringe on the rights or even interests of other
employees. Similarly, an employer was not required to offer training to an
employee with a disability which would allow him to transfer to another
position he could perform, because he had not completed an “‘expression
of interest’ form” required under the CBA.104 There was no showing that
allowing him to participate in the training, based on his verbal expression
of interest, would cause any undue hardship on the employer or infringe on
other employees’ rights or interests.105
Going one step further, one court denied a plaintiff’s request for an
accommodation in part because that employee had failed to file a
grievance in connection with her need to transfer to another position.106
Because the applicable CBA stated that a grievance regarding job
assignment “will be initiated” if management’s decision conflicts with a
personal physician’s opinion, the court concluded that this “unwillingness
to follow the proper procedure” showed that she had failed to request an
accommodation, even though she had filed a grievance earlier to seek
placement in a position she could perform.107 Without a second
grievance, the employer was “without authority” to transfer or reassign
her, and therefore the accommodation was unreasonable because the

101. VeuCausovic v. Ford Motor Co., No. 11-15488, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10668 at
*11, *21-25 (E.D. Mich. January 28, 2013).
102. Id.
103. Meador v. Metro. Water Reclamation Dist. of Greater Chi., No. 06 C 2705, 2007
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85719 at *32-34 (N.D. Ill. November 15, 2007).
104. Coppett v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 987 F. Supp. 2d 1264, 1284 (N.D. Ala. 2013).
105. Id. at 1284.
106. Lockard v. General Motors Corp., 128 F. Supp. 2d 458, 467-68, n. 9 (N.D. Ohio
2001)
107. Id.
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employer was not required to violate the terms of the CBA.108 This
court’s logic completely inverts the reasoning of the Court in Barnett that
sought to protect the interests of other employees. Instead, this court
allowed the employer to use the CBA as a shield against its ADA
obligations, arguing that if an employee does not assert her rights under
the CBA, any accommodation would be prohibited by that same CBA.
These decisions demonstrate the broad, perhaps unintended effect of
the Court’s Barnett decision. Employers have been allowed to deny any
accommodation which could arguably conflict with any provision in a
collective bargaining agreement, regardless of the impact of that
accommodation on the rights or even the interests of other employees.
This approach ignores the obligation of both employers and unions to
implement the ADA, and the ability of the parties to negotiate changes to
a CBA so as to address any conflicts that might arise between that CBA
and a requested accommodation.
C. An Alternative Approach
In contrast to the dismissed claims outlined above, a small
number of courts have been more hesitant in denying accommodations
based on policies or CBA provisions that do not directly implicate the
rights or interests of other employees. 109 One court explained that
unlike rights based on seniority, other contractual rights or provisions
may not “trump” the duty to provide an accommodation which
conflicts with that provision, particularly if the employer cannot show
that the accommodation would have an “adverse effect on the
collectively-bargained promotional rights of other employees or would
have interfered with or compromised the reasonable expectations of other
employees under other provisions of the CBA.”110

108. Id.
109. See Shapiro v. Twp. Of Lakewood, 292 F.3d 356, 359-61 (3d Cir. 2002) (explaining
employees seeking transfers as accommodations may not be required to follow employer’s
application procedures where employer is aware of disabled employee’s need to transfer);
Compare Tish v. Magee-Women’s Hosp. of Univ. of Pittsburgh Med. Ctr., No. 2:06-CV820, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87010 at *54-55 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 27, 2008)(noting employer’s
failure to establish the application process for transfers prevented consideration of plaintiff’s
transfer as accommodation) with a pre-Barnett decision: Calvin v. Ford Motor Co., 185 F.
Supp. 2d 792, 796-99 (E.D. Mich. 2002) (finding that the employee failed to submit bid for
positions sought as accommodation, as required by CBA, despite letter of understanding
between union and employer that parties would work together to make reasonable efforts to
place medically restricted employees).
110. Doe v. Town of Seymour, No. 3:95CV1538(AHN), 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 676 at
*11-12 (D. Conn. Jan. 16, 1998).
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The importance of such exceptions has been recognized by some
lower courts interpreting Barnett. These courts have been reluctant to
deny an accommodation based on an employer policy, other than
seniority, that did not constitute a “long-standing rule that might be said
to have created expectations of consistent, uniform treatment.”111 This
same logic has led to a refusal to defer to an employer’s determination that
an employee seeking a transfer as an accommodation is “less qualified”
than other applicants for an open position.112 One circuit court explained
that such a policy “does not involve the property-rights and administrative
concerns (and resulting burdens) presented by the violation of a seniority
policy.”113
Courts refusing to deny a transfer as an accommodation because the
employer deemed someone else to be “[more] qualified” have reasoned that
an employer should not be allowed to deny an accommodation based on its
own application of vague, subjective criteria,114 where the accommodation
would not thwart established employee expectations. As explained by one
trial court, Congressional intent could be undermined if an employer could
refuse to reassign a disabled person by always referring to a policy of
hiring the most qualified person for a job, although that court went on to
find that “[i]t is the province of employers, not courts, to determine which
applicants are most qualifiedfor an open position.”115
Even courts that allow an employer to deny transfer as an
accommodation require that the employer establish that the position sought
as an accommodation actually was filled by a better qualified applicant,116
or that the employer would have at least considered the plaintiff’s evidence

111. Moore v. Hexacomb Corp., 670 F. Supp. 2d 621, 629-31 (W.D. Mich. 2009).
112. Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., a Div. of Echlin, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1184 (10th Cir.
1999) (en banc); EEOC v. United Airlines, 693 F.3d 760, 764-65 (7th Cir. 2012); Midland
Brake, Inc., a Div. of Echlin, Inc., 180 F.3d at 1164-70; Aka v. Washington Hosp. Ctr., 156
F.3d 1284, 1296-98 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (en banc). See also Alston v. Washington Metro. Area
Transit Auth., 571 F. Supp. 2d 77, 83-84 (D.D.C. 2008) (applying Aka).
113. United Airlines, 693 F.3d at 764.
114. Shapiro, supra note 86, at 44.
115. Chapple v. Waste Mgmt., Inc., No. CIV. 05-2583 ADM/JSM, 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 14151 at *33 (D. Minn. Feb. 28, 2007).
116. King v. City of Madison, 550 F.3d 598,600 (7th Cir. 2008) (finding plaintiff was
not most qualified for positions outside her bargaining unit, for which she was only entitled
to compete under CBA); Huber v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 486 F.3d 480, 483-84 (8th Cir.
2007), cert. granted in part, 552 U.S. 1074, (2007), cert. dismissed, 552 U.S. 1136, (2008);
Carpenter v. Ohio Health Corp., No. 2:09-CV-965, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113067 (S.D.
Ohio Sept. 30, 2011); Haynes v. AT&T Mobility, LLC, No. 1:09-CV-450, 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 12066 at *14-15 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 8, 2011); Garcia v. Whirlpool Corp., No. 3:08-CV02944, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118409 at *17-18 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 5, 2010), aff’d (per
curium), 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 7327 (6th Cir. 2012).
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that he or she was more qualified than the person selected.117 These
decisions demonstrate how deference to an employer’s discretion,
discussed in more depth below, can allow an employer to rely on its
policies or even unsubstantiated hiring preferences, to deny an
accommodation. Such discretion can be limited through negotiation.
As recognized by a small number of courts, there are several reasons
why an accommodation which appears to or has the potential to
contradict a CBA provision is not necessarily unreasonable or the cause
of an undue burden. First, the employee with a disability may not
actually require an accommodation which violates or even deviates from
a bargained policy so as to interfere with another employee’s rights.118 If
an accommodation which does not conflict with a CBA would facilitate
the employee’s work, then the employer need not provide the
accommodation which could potentially conflict.119 Given a union’s
familiarity with not only the CBA but the work performed and the
employees who perform it, negotiation could help to reveal other possible
accommodations which would not create such a conflict.
Even if the only available accommodation appears to conflict with a
CBA, courts should not presume that an accommodation that contradicts
a seniority policy will necessarily affect the rights or interests of coworkers.120 If the skills and knowledge which are rewarded through a
seniority system are firm-specific or related to the employee’s previous
job, then the employee seeking a transfer based on his or her seniority
should not suffer a loss due to an accommodation that prevented that
transfer.121 Under this approach, courts should only find an undue
hardship based on an accommodation’s actual conflict with a seniority
system after understanding the purposes of that system. 122
Courts should also consider the specific circumstances surrounding a
requested accommodation before assuming that a conflict with a seniority
117. See Marshall v. AT&T Mobility, 793 F. Supp. 2d 761, 768 (D.S.C. 2011)
(dismissing claim because plaintiff failed to present evidence that he was most qualified for
positions sought as accommodation); Jackson v. FUJIFILM Mfg. USA, Inc., No.: 8:091328-RBH-BHH, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 141130 at *24-25 (D.S.C. June 18, 2010)
(explaining that federal courts “do not sit as a kind of super-personnel department weighing
the prudence of employment decisions”).
118. See, e.g., Medrano v. City of San Antonio, No. SA-02-CA-1003-RF, 2003 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 21654 at *9 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 1, 2003) (observing a dispute of fact as to
whether position sought as accommodation was filled by others with more or less seniority
than plaintiff).
119. Boyle, supra note 37, at 1037.
120. Harris, supra note 66, at 128, 149, 155 (noting effects on co-workers in one
workplace may not be the same in another, loss depends on purposes of seniority system).
121. Id. at 159.
122. Id. at 171-72.

2016]

BARGAINING FOR ACCOMMODATIONS

169

system (or some other contractual right) causes an undue hardship. For
example, if no other worker with sufficient seniority desires the position,
an employer should not deny a transfer as an accommodation for an
applicant or employee with a disability.123 A few courts have recognized
this absence of an actual conflict, as in a decision that returning an
employee to a driver position was a reasonable accommodation despite
the employer’s argument that the position was subject to a negotiated
seniority system, since the conflict would only arise if a more senior
employee later requested that same position and was therefore
“speculative.”124
Employees seeking accommodation have also succeeded where their
request did not directly conflict with a CBA or other employer policies,
such as shift assignments, leave limitations or hiring the best qualified
applicant for a position sought as an accommodation.125 In some
situations, the request for an accommodation may even be supported by
other contractual rights, such as the claim of an employee who sought a
transfer to a position that the CBA required to be filled by current or laid
off employees before hiring from the outside.126
Negotiation between the parties to a CBA often could resolve these
alleged or potential conflicts, since it may not always be obvious whether
an accommodation would violate a provision of a CBA. For example, one
court reviewing a request for a transfer as an accommodation found a
dispute of fact as to whether a plaintiff’s transfer violated the CBA, since
it was unclear whether he retained his previous group level.127 Likewise,
another court found issues of material fact regarding a CBA which
allegedly would be violated by an employee’s placement on the first shift
as an accommodation, where his plant seniority was sufficient to support
this placement, despite the employer’s position that shift assignments

123. Daly-Rooney, supra note 39, at 414.
124. Dilley v. SuperValu Inc., 296 F.3d 958, 963-64 (10th Cir. 2002). See also Norman v.
Univ. of Pittsburgh, No. CIV.A. 00-1655, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27694 at *45 (W.D. Pa.
Sept. 17, 2002) (finding that plaintiff did not request part time work prohibited by CBA).
125. Kosakoski v. The PNC Fin. Servs. Grp., Inc., No. 12-cv-00038, 2013 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 138234 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 26, 2013) (employer did not allege that persons hired were
more qualified than plaintiff); Roberts v. The Boeing Co., No. CV 05-6813 FMC (SHx),
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96660 at *29-30 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2006) (plaintiff sought return to
work not extension of leave). See also Simmons v. Lane Transit Dist., No. 04-6344-AA,
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22289 at *7 (D. Ore. Apr. 20, 2006) (explaining requested split shift
did not violate CBA).
126. EEOC v. Sharp Mfg. Co. of Am., Div. of Sharp Elecs. Corp., 534 F. Supp. 2d 797,
806-7 (W.D. Tenn. 2008).
127. Bell v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., No. 00-1518, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26481 at *39
(W.D. Pa. Aug. 29, 2002).
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should be based on departmental seniority.128
Bargaining may be helpful in identifying which CBA provisions
incorporate the “special circumstances” recognized by the Barnett court
as justification for requiring an accommodation that contradicts that
policy. Special circumstances recognized by courts interpreting Barnett include
an employer’s past exceptions to that policy, or different application of that
policy to other employees.129 For example, one employer was unable to
show that a transfer was unreasonable as an accommodation despite a
policy of considering seniority among bidders whose qualifications were
equal.130 This court rejected the employer’s reliance on this policy because
the decision could have been made on qualifications alone, and the
employer could waive the policy based on “business necessity.”131 This
analysis recognizes the reality that many seniority clauses include
exceptions such as super-seniority, selection of less senior employees with
specialized training, and the settlement of discrimination claims.132 Given
such exceptions, the employee with a disability can show that such a policy
should not be used to establish the unreasonableness or even the undue
hardship caused by his or her accommodation.133
In the limited number of cases where the employee has demonstrated
that the accommodation could be reasonable due to special circumstances,
the claim has survived a motion for summary judgment.134 For example,
a request for changes in work assignments and workloads was potentially
reasonable where such changes had been made in the past, despite a CBA
provision prohibiting limited or part time positions.135 Likewise, an
employer failed to establish an undue hardship based on a transfer of an
employee with a disability to a position she could perform, even though
that position generally carried a higher job classification than previously
held by that employee, where the employer had often transferred
employees without changing their job classification, and other higher-

128. Hill v. Kellogg USA, Inc., No. 8:02CV436, 8:04CV60, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
39843 at *26-27 (D. Neb. Aug. 11, 2005).
129. Soone v. Kyo-Ya Co., 353 F. Supp. 2d 1107, 1115 (D. Haw. 2005).
130. E.E.O.C. v. Valu Merchandisers Co., No. 01-2224-DJW, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
15632 at *25-26 (D. Kan. Aug. 9, 2002).
131. Daly-Rooney, supra note 39, at 397.
132. Id. at 407.
133. Barnett, 535 U.S. at 405.
134. See, e.g., O’Dell v. Dep’t. of Pub. Welfare Pennsylvania, 346 F. Supp. 2d 774, 78788 (W.D. Pa. 2004) (noting lack of approval for open positions may not make transfer
unreasonable).
135. Norman v. Univ. of Pittsburgh, No. CIV.A. 00-1655, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27694
at *45, 50 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 17, 2002).
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graded employees had performed that same position in the past.136
This consideration of “special circumstances” demonstrates that if a
policy incorporates exceptions for accommodation or is not interpreted
consistently among employees without disabilities, then it may not be
sufficient basis for denying a particular accommodation. Therefore, the
emphasis in reviewing requests for leave that goes beyond an employer’s
policies should focus on whether that employer has made exceptions for
other employees without disabilities.137 Courts should also consider
whether a greater burden is being placed on employees with disabilities who
are seeking leave compared to other employees whose requests for leave are
granted without the concrete medical evidence that is often required to
justify leave as an accommodation.
This allowance for “special circumstances” which could support an
accommodation that conflicts with a collective bargaining agreement has
drawn criticism. Even before Barnett was decided, an appellate court
which adopted a per se rule in favor of CBA provisions that conflict with
a requested accommodation worried:
a balancing approach would leave employers too vulnerable to
the possibility of guessing wrong when trying to weigh the
relative benefits and burdens on disabled and non-disabled
employees. The consequences of guessing wrong are especially
burdensomein the context of a collectively bargained seniority
system, where the employer and/or union might be subjected to
grievances or lawsuits filed by workers who were “bumped,” and
employers would be vulnerable to charges of unfair labor
practices under the NLRA.138
Bargaining and reliance on a grievance and arbitration system can
help parties to a CBA engage in more consistent application of a CBA.
Moreover, bargaining regarding individual requests for accommodation
can lead to an avoidance of disputes and potential litigation focused on
136. Office of the Architect of the Capitol v. Office of Compliance, 361 F.3d at 641-42
(Fed. Cir. 2004). Compare Droste v. Kroger Co., No. 187 F.3d 635 (6th Cir. 1999) (finding
that Kroger was not required to permanently transfer employee at same rate of pay to
position that paid less under CBA). See also Moore v. Hexacomb Corp., 670 F. Supp. 2d
621, 631 (W.D. Mich. 2009) (noting testimony that coworker would have agreed to give up
position to plaintiff despite employer “policy”); Johnson v. City of Pontiac, No. 05-73924,
2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23345 at *20 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 30, 2007) (observing conflicting
evidence regarding policy toward permanent light duty for police officers).
137. P.J. Petesch, EEOC Moves Toward Guidance Addressing Leave As a Reasonable
Accommodation
Under
the
ADA,
BNA
Insights
(June
23,
2011),
http://laborandemploymentlaw.bna.com/lerc/display/story_list.adp?mode=ins&frag_id=2118
2889&prod=dlln [http://perma.cc/89F5-CTES].
138. Willis v. Pacific Maritime Ass’n, 244 F.3d 675, 681 (9th Cir. 2001).
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which past conduct constitutes “special circumstances” recognized in
Barnett.
III.

DECISIONS ILLUSTRATING OPPORTUNITIES FOR BARGAINING

Court decisions that have recognized conflicts between requests for
accommodation and provisions of a CBA demonstrate the potential for
avoiding or resolving such conflicts through negotiation. Opportunities
for bargaining over issues that potentially conflict with the provision of
ADA accommodations include defining the essential job duties of
positions, the role of seniority in awarding transfers and overtime, and
contractual benefits such as leave time.
Even prior to the Barnett decision, the Third Circuit recognized the
potential role of negotiation in providing accommodations.139 It is
interesting that this decision was often cited pre-Barnett to support
dismissal of claims seeking accommodations that arguably conflicted
with a CBA. In dismissing a claim of an employee seeking to be excused
from mandatory overtime, the court focused on the absence of the union’s
agreement to waive the seniority provision, even though the union had
temporarily agreed to not enforce the seniority provision and a union
officer had indicated that such a waiver “may be possible.”140 The
accommodation was deemed unreasonable in part because the employer
would be exposed to potential grievances seeking to enforce other
employees’ seniority rights. While stating that “we cannot assume that the
union’s acquiescence will continue indefinitely,” the court acknowledged
that the union could agree in the future to waive the seniority provision for
the plaintiff, which would “eliminate the basis” for the court’s conclusion
that the accommodation was unreasonable.141
As recognized by that Third Circuit decision, the Barnett decision
left open the door for unions to play a significant role in negotiating about
accommodations.142
The need for greater coordination between
employers and unions regarding claims for accommodation is illustrated
by decisions in which claims for accommodation were dismissed based
on prohibitive language in a CBA. In an extreme example, one court
refused to require that an employer permanently assign an employee to a
position with certain functions she could perform despite her disability,
139. Kralik v. Durbin, 130 F.3d 76, 81 (3d Cir. 1997).
140. Id.
141. Id. at 83, 83 n.7.
142. See RUTH O’BRIEN, BODIES IN REVOLT 139 (Routledge 2005) (explaining that the
Barnett decision empowers organized labor unions in negotiating accommodations and
work conditions for its disabled members).
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where the CBA supported the employer’s position that was essential for
employees in that job to be able to perform various functions.143 Such an
accommodation was deemed unreasonable even though the union was
willing to waive the contractual requirements that she be able to perform
a variety of functions.144 This conclusion raises the question of why this
issue was not recognized as a mandatory subject of bargaining, on which
the union could at a minimum insist on negotiation to impasse.145
A union often takes the position that CBA language should control
over a conflicting request for an accommodation, perhaps reflecting its
obligation to represent its able-bodied membership.146 For example, an
employee whose impairment led to discharge from his previous position
was not allowed to bid for a position which he could perform, based on
CBA language limiting the availability of that position to internal
employees.147 This application of the CBA is particularly concerning
since the impairment resulted from a work-related injury. The union
could have agreed to make the position available to him but refused to do
so.
As in this example, other courts applying Barnett to a CBA have
failed to require any negotiation regarding a potential deviation from an
established policy such as a seniority system. For instance, where a CBA
required that vacant positions be filled based on seniority, a reviewing
court stated that the employer “was not required to approach the union
regarding a variance before the request [for a transfer] could be deemed
unreasonable.”148 This approach flies in the face of the NLRA’s duty to
bargain, as well as the ADA’s duty to interact. Moreover, courts
frequently focus on the costs of accommodations to employers (and
sometimes to co-workers), and only consider an accommodation as
143. Miller v. Dept. of Corrections of Illinois, 916 F. Supp. 863, 871 (C.D. Ill. 1996).
144. Id.
145. See, e.g., Bozeman Deaconess Pound. v. Montana Nurses Ass’n, 322 N.L.R.B.
1107, 1118-19 (1997) (adding 100-pound lifting requirement violated Section 8(a)(1) and
(5) by unilaterally changing the RNs’ job description prior to expiration of CBA). See also
Judith Fornalik, supra note 25, at 127 (noting that a union is not obligated to bargain over
terms in a current CBA and can refuse to negotiate with the employer over reasonable
accommodations, however if the accommodation cannot be implemented without the
assistance of the union, then the union would be in violation of the ADA.).
146. See, e.g., Lockard v. General Motors Corp., 128 F. Supp. 2d 458, 460 (N.D. Ohio
2001), aff’d 52 Fed. Appx. 782 (6th Cir. 2002) (highlighting a situation where a union took
the position that plaintiff did not have enough seniority for positions sought as
accommodations).
147. Wilder v. Am General, LCC, No. 3:11 CV 203, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42593 at
*5, 15 (N.D. Ind. March 31, 2015).
148. Roberts v. Kaiser Foundation Hospital, No. 2:12-cv-2506-CKD, 2015 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 16169 at *26 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 10, 2015).
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beneficial to the disabled employee,149 without recognizing the much
broader benefits of negotiating over accommodations.
The Barnett decision allows negotiation regarding the
reasonableness of a requested accommodation.150 Thus, there are several
areas of potential conflict between a CBA and a request for
accommodation that could be reconciled through negotiation at the
inception of the CBA or on an individualized basis, including basic
limitations on the ability to discharge. Generally, a just cause provision
could provide protection for an employee who is discharged based on an
inability to perform his or her job duties, where that inability arises
because of the employer’s failure to accommodate. For example, one
CBA provided that an employee could only be terminated after
reasonable accommodations had been made.151
Beyond improvements to a CBA’s just cause provision, numerous
aspects of a CBA could incorporate and address potential conflicts with
requests for accommodations, such as decisions often based on seniority
alone. Moreover, CBA provisions could provide greater clarity on terms
and conditions of employment that sometimes determine the
reasonableness of an accommodation request, such as defining the
essential job duties of positions covered by the CBA.
A. Duties of the Position
One area of dispute under the ADA is whether the employee
qualifies as a person with a disability who is then entitled to
accommodation, or whether an employee is able to perform the essential
duties of a position.152 These factual questions are often based on
potentially conflicting information from health care providers.153 Parties
149. See, e.g., Miller, 916 F. Supp. at 868 (Department of Corrections could not
accommodate newly-blind employee in her current role, but it was not considered that the
DOC could have negotiated with the union on accommodating the employee in a full-time
role that would have been beneficial to both parties).
150. 535 U.S. at 405 (employer may retain right to seniority system so that employees
will not expect that system will be followed, reducing hardship from not following seniority
system).
151. See, e.g., Multi-Clean, Inc., 102 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 463 (1993) (Miller, Arb.)
(examining a CBA that allowed for a company to unilaterally fire an employee who could
no longer perform his duties as long as reasonable accommodations were made).
152. Basas, supra note 4, at 81-83.
153. See, e.g., McAlindin v. County of San Diego, 192 F.3d 1226, 1235 (9th Cir.
1999) (using medical evidence to determine the factual question about whether the
Plaintiff’s impairment substantially limited his major life activities); Borgialli v. Thunder
Basis Coal Co., 235 F.3d 1284, 1294-95 (10th Cir. 2000) (finding it reasonable to use
medical evidence to determine if Plaintiff could return to work and not be a direct threat
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to a CBA can incorporate a process to make this determination. For
example, one CBA involved in arbitration awards included a process of
referrals to different health care providers to arrive at a determination as
to whether the employee had a disability;154 several CBAs included a
process to determine if an employee could still perform his or her
duties.155
Related to defining essential job duties, disputes sometimes arise as
to whether or not an employee can perform essential duties despite his or
her disability. Negotiation can help resolve factual determinations
regarding performance, such as the claim of a school employee who
sought a transfer to a sedentary position because of her physical
limitations.156 The trial court had accepted the school’s argument that she
was not qualified for the sedentary position, even though the position was
less physically demanding than her previous position, she thought she
could perform the duties and the School Board had deemed her
“minimally qualified.”157 Unfortunately for her, it took more than three
years after she first sought an accommodation for the Court of Appeals to
remand her claim after denying the school’s motion for summary
judgment.
Collective bargaining can help to avoid such factual disputes. For
example, a CBA with a coal company specified that an employee could
not be discharged or refused recall for medical reasons “without the
concurrence of a majority of a group composed of an Employer-approved
physician, an Employee-approved physician, and a physician agreed to by
the Employer and the Employee, that there has been a deterioration in
physical condition which prevents the Employee from performing his
regular work.”158 Creation of such a process can help to resolve disputes
over whether an employee is able to perform his or her job duties.
Beyond determining the capacity of an employee with a disability, a
CBA can provide clarity on the question of whether a particular job duty
is essential, which often determines whether an accommodation is
reasonable.159 Accurate identification of essential job duties has long been
to his colleagues).
154. Noranda Aluminum, 119 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 217 (2003) (Gordon, Arb.).
155. BWXT Pantex, 120 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 385 (2004) (Jennings, Arb.); Pittsburgh
& Midway Coal Mining Co., 123 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 239 (2006) (West, Arb.); CH2MWG Idaho, 134 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 876 (2014) (DiFalco, Arb.).
156. Woodruff v. School Bd. of Seminole Cty. Fla., 304 Fed. Appx. 795, 801 (11th Cir.
2008).
157. Id.
158. Anderson v. Consolidation Coal Co., No. 14-2048, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 1011 at
*18-19 (4th Cir. Jan. 21, 2016).
159. Goodman v. Unity Township PA, No. 2:03-cv-1650, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18138
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recognized as important for effective recruiting, conducting objective
interviews, making informed selection decisions, and producing accurate
performance appraisals.160
Through requests for accommodation,
employees with disabilities (and the unions representing them) are in a
position to “scrutinize business operations” by participating in the
determination of which duties are essential for their position.161
Determinations of the essential job duties of a position are ripe for
bargaining as an alternative to litigation to resolve an employee’s request
for an accommodation.162 Shortly after the ADA was adopted, an expert
for the American Management Association recognized that legislators
“intended that employers and unions would revisit... collective bargaining
restrictions” on assignment of job tasks to “help open up more
opportunities to people with disabilities.”163 Thus, a union and employer
can jointly help to resolve factual questions regarding job duties, rather
than leaving that determination solely to the employer’s discretion or
waiting for a claim to go to federal court. For example, a dispute about
whether an employee was required to drive a semi-truck to haul the
excavator could have been resolved through negotiation.164 Instead, the
employee’s ADA claim was remanded by the circuit court more than
three years after his discharge.
Like job duties of one position, the need for rotation between
different duties or tasks to avoid ADA claims is also ripe for
negotiation.165 An employee with a disability may face discharge even if
she can perform current job duties, where the CBA allows the employer
to rotate employees into positions with different duties that the employee
at *17 (W.D. Pa. March 30, 2006), aff’d. 251 Fed. Appx. 104 (3d Cir. 2007).
160. ARLENE VERNON-OEHMKE, EFFECTIVE HIRING & ADA COMPLIANCE 28 (American
Management Association 1994).
161. O’Brien, supra note 142, at 113.
162. Dubault, supra note 48, at 1294 (parties can perform job analysis for each position
in bargaining unit and incorporate into CBA). See e.g., Brickers v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ.,
145 F.3d 846, 849 (6th Cir. 1998) (examining the scope of essential duties is question of
fact); Goodman, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18138 at *14-16 (looking at questions of fact
regarding allegedly essential duties not referenced in CBA); EEOC v. Sharp, 534 F. Supp.
2d at 806 (examining a CBA that allowed assignment to a variety of tasks). See also EEOC
regulations, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3) (showing that the terms of CBA are 1 or 7 factors for
determining whether a particular function or duty is essential).
163. VERNON-OEHMKE, supra note 147, at 32.
164. Henschel v. Clare Cnty. Rd. Comm’n, 737 F.3d 1017, 1022 (6th Cir. 2013); See
also Mobley v. Miami Valley Hospital, 603 Fed. Appx. 405, 411-12 (6th Cir. 2015)
(regarding a dispute where the employer of an environmental technician failed to engage in
a good-faith dialogue concerning his accommodation, and the case was remanded by circuit
court just less than 3 years following his discharge).
165. See, e.g., Turner v. Hershey Chocolate USA, 440 F.3d 604, 607, 612-13 (3d Cir.
2006).
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with a disability cannot perform.166 In some situations, courts even defer
to an employer’s interpretation of CBA language regarding rotation of job
duties, even where the language does not clearly require rotation.167 Based
on such an interpretation, one court concluded that the requested
accommodation would violate other employees’ contractual rights.168
Negotiation could resolve some of these issues. In one case, a
request for an accommodation by a Hershey line employee could have
been resolved by negotiating with the union regarding her request to
avoid rotating into positions she could not perform because of her
disability, a duty which had not been addressed in the collective
bargaining agreement.169
Negotiation could have helped resolve
Hershey’s alleged concern that her failure to rotate could potentially
increase the risk of injury to other employees due to repetitive motion.
These decisions demonstrate how a CBA could incorporate a process
to determine objectively whether an employee with a disability is still
able to perform the essential job duties of her position. Moreover,
negotiation can give the union a voice in determining what duties are in
fact essential as well as provide guidance as to which accommodations,
regarding the performance of duties, are reasonable.
B. Transfer as an Accommodation
If an employee cannot perform the essential duties of her position,
negotiation between the employer and the union could resolve questions
surrounding the reasonableness of a transfer as an accommodation.
Parties to a CBA often negotiate regarding transfers for employees who
are injured on the job. For example, one CBA covering mechanics
provided that employees who are injured on the job and cannot perform
the duties of their position must be given preference for light duty
work.170 Similar agreements could lead to greater availability of transfers
as an accommodation, which can often mean the difference between
continued employment and discharge for an employee with a disability.
Potential conflicts between a request for accommodation and the

166. See e.g., Nalley v. Donahoe, No. 3:11-0610, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87736 at *2326 (M.D. Tenn. June 27, 2014) (finding that the claim of a mail handler who requested
reassignment turned on the question of whether new position required rotation through
different tasks).
167. Alamer v. Ralcorp Frozen Bakery Products, Inc., No. 3:09-CV-76-H, 2011 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 98367 at *24 (W.D. Ky. Aug. 30, 2011).
168. Id. at *24-25.
169. Turner, 440 F.3d at, 607, 612-13.
170. Blakeley v. US Airways, Inc., 23 F. Supp. 2d 560, 563-64 (W.D. Pa. 1998).
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seniority rights of others can be resolved through negotiation. The Eckles
decision, widely relied upon and criticized before the Barnett decision,
involved a CBA that allowed the employer and the union to agree to
provide a reassignment as an accommodation without regard to
seniority.171 Despite this permissive language regarding seniority that
was part of the CBA, the court declined to read this provision as requiring
a non-seniority-based assignment, failing to recognize that any seniority
system (or any other CBA provision) is a creature of the CBA and any
limitation on that right is also an enforceable part of the contract.172
Similarly, the parties to a CBA could negotiate to provide clarity for
determinations of whether a transfer would be a reasonable
accommodation. For example, the GM–UAW national agreement has
permitted, but not required, a local union and employer to waive seniority
provisions in a local agreement to allow the reassignment of an employee
with a disability who otherwise lacks the seniority for the requested
position.173 Even though both GM and the union were named in the claim
made by an employee with a disability resulting from a work injury, who
sought a position which required more seniority than he had, the court
concluded that GM and the UAW “could not transfer” the plaintiff into
such a position “without violating the contractual rights of other
employees.”174
A later decision involving a 1996 GM-UAW CBA likewise allowed
a worker returning from an injury to displace only a less senior worker,
unless the UAW agreed to the displacement of a more senior worker,175
and another CBA for a different GM plant stated that returning employees
“will be employed in other work on jobs that are operating in the plant
which they can do without regard to any seniority provisions of this
Agreement, except that such employees may not displace employees with
longer seniority....”176 The court reviewing these provisions concluded that
a transfer was not a reasonable accommodation because “GM and the
UAW are not required [to] violate the CBA by ignoring or accommodating
the Plaintiff’s seniority, or lack thereof, in order to facilitate her placement
171. Eckles v. Consol. Rail Corp., 94 F.3d 1041, 1044 n.2 (7th Cir. 1996) (“a disabled
employee covered by this Agreement may be placed . . . in a position occupied by another
employee, without regard to seniority, provided that such an employee is capable of
performing the duties required.”).
172. McGlothlen & Savine, supra note 34, at 1053.
173. Boback v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. 95-3836, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 297 at *12-14
(6th Cir. Jan. 3, 1997).
174. Id. at *14.
175. Lockard v. Gen. Motors Corp., 128 F. Supp. 2d 458, 460 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 16,
2001), aff’d 52 Fed. Appx. 782 (6th Cir. 2002).
176. Id. at 465 n.4.
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in a position suited to her physical limitations.”177 As in the earlier GMUAW case, this conclusion ignores the reality that seniority is a function of
the agreement between the employer and the union, and that an agreement
between those parties to the CBA could resolve any conflict with its
provisions. It is therefore false to conclude that those same parties could
not agree to change those contractual rights in order to provide the
accommodation which would have allowed the employee with a disability
to remain employed at GM.
Contractual provisions regarding transfers are ripe for negotiation to
avoid or resolve conflicts between a request for accommodation and a
CBA. A CBA could explicitly allow for a transfer as an accommodation
despite a lack of seniority,178 at least as a temporary solution.179 This
approach has been adopted by United Airlines in its company policy,
which gives employees with disabilities preferential treatment in seeking
transfers.180 A less extreme solution can be found in CBAs providing for
retention of seniority while an employee is on leave due to an illness or
injury.181 An exception to seniority could also be accomplished through
case-by-case mutual agreement of the employer and the union.182 For
example, some CBAs provide that the employer and union can agree to
an accommodation that might otherwise contradict other contractual
rights.183
177. Id. at 466.
178. Calvin v. Ford Motor Co., 185 F. Supp. 2d 792, 796 (E.D. Mich. 2002) (showing
that a work-related injury/illness entitles placement in other work without regard to
seniority). See also Collective Bargaining Negot. & Cont. (BNA), 120.03 (highlighting
CBAs between Owens Corning and Glass and Pottery Workers (by mutual agreement),
Tyler Refrigeration Corp. and Paperworkers, Allegheny Energy and Utility Workers,
Wisconsin Physicians Service Insurance Corp. and Food and Commercial Workers, BF
Goodrich Specialty Chemicals and Electrical Workers to show that the employer and the
employee may work together to find the job best suited to the disabled parties qualifications
and disability).
179. See, e.g., Collective Bargaining Negot. & Cont. (BNA), supra note 168 (examining
CBAs between ICI Americas Inc. and Teamsters, Distribution Trucking Co. and Teamsters
to show that when an employee is temporarily disabled, they should be temporarily
relocated to accommodate their disability).
180. EEOC v. United Airlines, Inc., 693 F.3d 760, 761 (7th Cir. 2012).
181. Champion Int’l Corp. v. United Paperworkers Int’l Union, 106 Lab. Arb. Rep.
(BNA) 1024 (1996) (Overstreet, Arb.).
182. See, e.g., Collective Bargaining Negot. & Cont (BNA), supra note 168 at 120.03
(examining CBAs between Inland Container Corp. and Paperworkers, Kansas City Power
and Light Co. and Electrical Workers, Peabody International Corp., Peabody Galion Div.
and Machinists to explain that when a disabled party is unable to fulfill the duties of his job,
the employer may place that employee in any bid job without the need for posting).
183. Eckles v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 94 F.3d 1041, 1044 (1996); Int’l Bd. of
Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO v. Employer 2012 LA Supp. 148860 (BNA) (2012)
(Grossman, Arb.); Local_, Milwaukee Transp. Serv. v. Amalgamated Transit Union,
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Parties to a CBA sometimes specify that an employee with a
disability may be transferred regardless of seniority principles in the
CBA;184 other agreements allow displacement of another worker while
others prohibit such displacement.185 Some parties may even agree to the
reservation of certain positions for employees with disabilities.186 Other
CBAs may give the employer the ability to discuss an accommodation
directly with the employee, “without any obligation to disclose an
employee’s disability with the Union, unless the employee has made a
voluntary and knowing written waiver of his rights to confidentiality under
the ADA.”187 For example, an employee’s request to transfer to other
facilities where work that he could perform was available was deemed
unreasonable, based on the limitations in the CBA that only allowed
transfers for current or laid off employees, thereby excluding the plaintiff
because he was not currently working due to his disability.188
In considering transfer as an accommodation, the ADA only requires
that an employer transfer an employee with a disability to a vacant position,
rather than bumping another employee.189 But this raises the question as to
when the position is actually vacant, resulting in litigation regarding the
reasonableness of requests to transfer as accommodations.190 The timing of
Local 998, 2009 LA Supp. 119548 (BNA)(2009)(Vernon, Arb.); State of Ohio v. Ohio
Civil Serv. Employees Assoc./AFSCME, Local 11, 118 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1361
(2003) (Murphy, Arb.); Interstate Brands Corp. v. Bakery, Confectionary and Tobacco
Workers Local 149, 113 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 161 (1999) (Howell, Arb.); Alcoa Bldg.
Prods. v. Aluminum, Brick, & Glass Workers Int’l Union Local 117, 104 Lab. Arb. Rep.
(BNA) 364 (1995) (Cerone, Arb.).
184. Collective Bargaining Negot. & Cont (BNA), supra note 168 at 107.45 (explaining
CBA between Lockheed Martin Space Systems Co. and Machinists. to elucidate that an
employee with a disability may be placed at any position regardless of seniority).
185. Compare Collective Bargaining Negot. & Cont (BNA), supra note 168 at 120.03
(showcasing CBA of IBP and Food and Commercial Workers to show that an ADA
accommodation cannot result in a displacement), with Collective Bargaining Negot. & Cont
(BNA), supra note 168, at 120.03 (using CBA between Harbison-Walker Refractories and
Aluminum, Brick and Glass Workers to show that an employee with a disability can
displace a junior, but still abled employee).
186. See, e.g., Collective Bargaining Negot. & Cont (BNA), supra note 168 at 120.03
(examining CBA between Celotex Corp. and Paperworkers to explain that a company must
designate certain jobs as handicapped jobs should the union consent).
187. See, e.g., Collective Bargaining Negot. & Cont (BNA), supra note 168 at 120.03
(highlighting CBA between Coca-Cola Enterprises Inc., Eastern Great Lakes Div. and
Teamsters to show that an employer can speak directly to the disabled employee regarding
his or her disability).
188. VeuCausovic v. Ford Motor Co., No. 11-15488, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10668 at
*11, 21-25 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 28, 2013).
189. 29 C.F.R. §1630.2(o) (2012) (App); Davoll v. Webb, 194 F.3d 1116, 1131-32 (10th
Cir. 1999).
190. See, e.g., Johnson v. Otter Tail Co., No. 98-2237, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20671 at
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such an opening can have significant consequences for an employee
seeking a transfer to a position she can perform, such as the mail clerk
whose request for a transfer to a permanent vacant position was denied
because she was on temporary light duty at the time.191 Similarly, a thirtyfive-year BellSouth employee might have benefitted from negotiation
where he was not offered a transfer into a position he could perform
because he was receiving termination pay when it became open, and he did
not “inquire about the position,” even though he had previously requested
transfer as an accommodation.192 That court limited the employer’s
obligation to accommodate to following the provisions of the applicable
CBA.193
Negotiation could help clarify when a position is “vacant” for
purposes of a transfer as an accommodation. EEOC regulations state that a
transfer would be reasonable if the position will be vacant within a
“reasonable amount of time”; courts have either adopted this language or
held that a position should be considered for accommodation purposes if it
is currently vacant or will become vacant sometime in the near future.194
The EEOC Guidelines go on to state that a reasonable amount of time
should be determined “in light of the totality of the circumstances.”195 This
guidance opens the door for negotiations regarding which positions should
be considered vacant for purposes of transfers as accommodations. For
example, one CBA allows employees to remain eligible for transfer for
three years after they are unable to perform their previous duties.196
These CBA provisions demonstrate that the potential for conflict
between a CBA’s provisions affecting transfers and a request for
accommodation can be reconciled through negotiation. Such negotiation
would facilitate the use of transfers to accommodate employees with
disabilities that prevent their continued employment in a previous
position, while still protecting the interests of other employees.
*26-32 (D. Minn. July 24, 2000) (finding that employer did not have a duty to reassign
plaintiff beyond a reasonable amount of time, and here the employee would only be able to
return to work one year and three months after her original termination).
191. Simpson v. Potter, No. 07-584-SLR, 686 F. Supp. 2d 475; 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
17047 at *17 (D. Del. Feb. 25, 2010). See also Chapple v. Waste Mgmt., Inc., No. CIV. 052583 ADM/JSM, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14151 at *4 (D. Minn. Feb. 28, 2007) (examining
what period of time Plaintiff applied to other open positions).
192. Meade v. AT&T Corp., No. 15-6362, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 14256 at *15-16 (6th
Cir., Aug. 2, 2016).
193. Id. at *16.
194. Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1175 (10th Cir. 1999) (en banc).
195. EEOC Guidance, supra note 34; Dark v. Curry Cnty., 451 F.3d 1078, 1089-1090
(9th Cir. 2006).
196. Alston v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 571 F. Supp. 2d 77, 83-84
(D.D.C. 2008)

182

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 19:1

C. Overtime & Shifts
Like requests for transfer, the assignment of overtime can also be
negotiated to avoid any conflict with the inability of an employee with a
disability to work overtime. Distribution of overtime is covered by almost
three-fourths of all CBAs, including reliance on seniority and the
scheduling of overtime across different job classifications.197 In contrast,
other CBAs have included a provision that an employee may refuse
mandatory overtime “due to extreme personal fatigue, illness or other
special circumstances.”198 Instead of suggesting or even requiring
negotiation, however, one court recently held that an employee’s request
to avoid mandatory overtime as an accommodation was unreasonable,
where the CBA provided a rotating process for assignment of overtime
and one employee had complained about covering the plaintiff’s
overtime.199 In this case, the court specifically found that the employer
did engage in an “ongoing interactive process” with the employee to find
a “mutually agreeable accommodation,”200 yet there was no mention of
any interaction between the employer and the union to resolve the issue.
Like mandatory overtime, shift assignments are often assigned based
on seniority under CBAs,201 presumably because of employees’ preference
for working certain shifts. Courts have concluded that variance from this
provision as an accommodation for an employee with a disability would
necessarily burden other employees.202 In contrast, some parties to a CBA
have given the employer the authority to change shift assignments “to
accommodate an employee or to meet unexpected conditions if reasonable

197. See, e.g., Collective Bargaining Negot. & Cont (BNA), supra note 168, at 115.305
(using CBAs between Martin-Brower Co. and Teamsters, Millar Elevator Service Co. and
Teamsters to show that a more senior employee may refuse overtime if a more junior
employee is available).
198. See, e.g., Collective Bargaining Negot. & Cont (BNA), supra note 168, at 115.305
(using CBA between Washington Hospital Center and National Nurses United to show that
an employee may refuse overtime due to illness).
199. Chavira v. Crown Cork & Seal USA, Inc., No. 13-1734, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
108682 at *24-26 (D. Minn. August 18, 2015).
200. Id. at *26.
201. BNA, Basic Patterns, supra note 57, at 87 (seniority used in granting transfer
requests).
202. See, e.g., Laurin v. Providence Hospital, 150 F.3d 52, 54-60 (1st Cir. 1998); Doe v.
Town of Seymour, No. 3:95CV1538(AHN), 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 676 at *4-5 (D. Conn.
January 15, 1998); See also Collective Bargaining Negot. & Cont (BNA), supra note 168, at
117.233 (explaining CBAs between Akron General Medical Center and Steelworkers,
General Tire Inc. and Steelworkers, Northeastern Pennsylvania Health Corp. and
Pennsylvania Nurses Association to show that seniority prevails provided employee has
skill & ability).
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notification is provided.”203
As seen with transfers, negotiation can help to resolve conflicts
between the need to accommodate the limitations of an employee with a
disability and the scheduling of overtime shifts. Such negotiation could
mean the difference between retention of employment and discharge for an
employee with a disability, with little or no impact on the interests of other
able-bodied employees.
D. Leave as an Accommodation
As with the definition of essential duties and the role of seniority,
leave provisions could be clarified or renegotiated in response to a need
for additional leave as an accommodation. Violations of leave policies
and unauthorized absences have been common grounds for discharge
under CBAs.204 CBAs almost always include some provision addressing
leaves of absence,205 but do not necessarily explicitly provide that one’s
disability can provide grounds for an exception to those grounds. In
practice, employers often retain discretion to decide whether to approve
the request for leave, often based on the employer’s judgment as to
whether the employee has a “good” reason for the leave.206 Alternatively,
a CBA may provide for leave for a reason that is “mutually acceptable” to
the employer and the union.207
Both before and after Barnett was decided, leave often has been
denied as an accommodation based on an employer’s policy on how much
leave is available for its employees.208 In one case, an employee who
203. See, e.g., Collective Bargaining Negot. & Cont (BNA), supra note 168, at 115.252
(using CBA between BellSouth Telecommunications Inc. and Communications Workers to
show that the Company may make changes to accommodate an employee).
204. BNA, Basic Patterns supra note 57 at 7.
205. Id. at 71-72.
206. See, e.g., Collective Bargaining Negot. & Cont (BNA), supra note 168, at 116.201
(examining CBAs between Phoenix Transit System and Transit Union, McDonnell Douglas
Corp. and Electrical Workers, Vickers Inc. and Electronic Workers, Safeway Stores Inc. and
Food and Commercial Workers, Northwest Aluminum Co. and Steelworkers, HarleyDavidson Motor Co. and Machinists to show that an employee may be granted a leave of
absence for a good and sufficient reason).
207. See, e.g., Collective Bargaining Negot. & Cont (BNA), supra note 168 at 116.201
(explaining CBA between Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co. and Machinists, Muskegon Piston
Ring Co. Inc., Wausau Div. and Machinists, Titeflex Corp. and Teamsters to highlight that a
leave of absence may be granted for any reason deemed satisfactory by the company).
208. See Stacy A. Hickox & Joseph Guzman, Leave as an Accommodation: When is
Enough, Enough?, 62 CLEVELAND STATE L. REV. 437, 463-71, 481-82 (2014) (discussing
cases cited above); see also Samper v. Providence St. Vincent Med. Ctr., 675 F.3d 1233,
1235-36 (9th Cir. 2012) (finding that seven unplanned absences exceeded policy allowing
five); Crano v. Graphic Packaging Corp., 65 F. App’x 705, 708 (10th Cir. 2003) (approving
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could not work due to his mental health issues attempted to rely on
language in the applicable CBA which stated that “[w]hen the requirements
of service permit, employees... will be granted written leave of absence for
a limited time....”209 While not finding that the CBA supported the
reasonableness of his request for leave, the court acknowledged that it was
“conceivable that an employer could extend certain assurances to an
employee regarding job security while the employee is on medical
leave.”210
In the union context, limits on leave in a CBA often justify denial of
additional leave as an accommodation. 211 For example, the extension of
leave beyond the six months provided under the applicable CBA was
deemed unreasonable, where an extension was subject to union approval,
and such an extension had not occurred during 40 years of union
representation.212
That court concluded, without explanation, that
extension of leave for one employee “can be unfair to other members and
can potentially result in the employer facing consequences.”213 At the
same time, other courts have recognized that leave beyond what is
provided under an employer’s policy can be a reasonable
accommodation.214 Bargaining could help resolve the confusion that
results from these different approaches to determining how much leave
constitutes a reasonable accommodation.
E. Bargaining as an Alternative
Courts applying Barnett to claims involving a CBA often fail to
require, or simply recognize, that bargaining could clarify, or even
resolve, conflicts between the requested accommodation and the CBA.
One court even specifically held that an employer’s failure to initiate
bargaining does not render an accommodation unreasonable.215 In that
discharge after one year under employer’s policy). But see Nunes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,
164 F.3d 1243, 1247 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that leave of up to one year was reasonable
where employer policy allowed one year of unpaid medical leave).
209. Quintero v. Canadian Pacific Railway, No. 13-cv-6249, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
147983 at *10 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 2, 2015).
210. Id. at *24.
211. See, e.g., Davis v. Thomas Jefferson University, No. 14-4300, 2015 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 88975 at *19 (E.D. Pa. July 8, 2015).
212. Id.
213. Id. .
214. See, e.g., Ralph v. Lucent Tech.,135 F.3d 166, 172 (1st Cir. 1998) (stating leave
beyond fifty-two weeks provided by employer policy could be reasonable); see also GarciaAyala v. Lederle Parenterals, Inc., 212 F.3d 638, 646 (1st Cir. 2000) (holding that an
employer cannot justify denial of additional leave based on policy alone).
215. Thursby v. City of Scranton, No. 3:CV-02-2355, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33475 at
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case, an employee sought a no-smoking policy as an accommodation, but
that policy was rescinded based on the police chief’s belief that it was
obligated to bargain with the union over it.216 The court concluded that
even if the employer had an obligation to bargain over the policy, it could
not establish that the requested policy would impose an undue hardship as
an accommodation where the city failed to even attempt to negotiate a
policy with the union, and it had negotiated other similar policies with
other unions representing its employees in other departments.217 This
decision illustrates that courts hearing ADA claims are not going to push
parties to a CBA to negotiate in order to help resolve conflicts between an
accommodation request and a CBA.
In contrast to the narrow view taken by the decisions outlined above,
a small number of courts have required that an employer engage in the
requisite interactive process to promote voluntary agreements regarding
the reasonableness of an accommodation. These courts have held that
generally, it is the employer’s duty to engage in the interactive process and
“requires the employer to take some initiative.”218 This requirement has
been extended to condemn an employer that denied an accommodation
request after the union agreed to an accommodation involving an excuse
from overtime for an employee whose disability prevented overtime
work, based on the employer’s claim that it would violate the collective
bargaining agreement that provided for assignment of mandatory
overtime based on inverse seniority.219
Taking this obligation to interact one step further, courts have
sometimes declined to dismiss a claim for accommodation despite a
union’s refusal to agree to a variation from contract language.220 For
example, a UPS employee was not provided with a transfer as an
accommodation, in part because the union refused to allow him to
transfer his seniority from one location to another, where a position he
could perform was available.221 Despite this opposition, the court denied
summary judgment for UPS, which had argued that this opposition
showed that the CBA prevented the assignment of any employee from one
operations center to another.222 While still respecting the weight given to
*21 (M.D. Pa. May 25, 2006).
216. Id. at *19.
217. Id. at *21.
218. Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 296, 315 (3d Cir. 1999).
219. Smith v. Burlington Co. of New Jersey, No. 02-5581(JEI), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
18032; at *3-4, 17-18 (D.N.J. July 27, 2004).
220. See, e.g., Williams v. United Parcel Servs., Inc., No.: 2:10-1546-RMG, 2012 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 23080 at *17 (D.S.C. Feb. 23, 2012).
221. Id..
222. Id. at *20.
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seniority under the CBA, the court found that the plaintiff’s seniority may
have entitled him to another position at another location, which would have
been a reasonable accommodation.223
For many types of accommodations, negotiation could help to clarify
the obligation to provide an accommodation under the ADA, while
avoiding conflicts with preexisting rights of other employees, and even
respecting the interests of both the employer and co-workers. The
benefits of negotiation over accommodations, outlined below, stem from
the process itself, as well as more specific benefits for employers, unions
and employees with disabilities.
IV.

BENEFITS OF BARGAINING FOR ALL

Collective bargaining can and should facilitate the accommodation
process. First, the parties to a CBA should recognize that future requests
for accommodation may come into conflict with a right or a process that is
created by the CBA. As demonstrated by the decisions outlined above,
CBA provisions that may conflict with an accommodation include the
consideration of seniority and other processes surrounding transfers to a
different position, provisions allowing paid or unpaid leave, and preference
for or required overtime. The parties to a CBA can anticipate and create a
process to address such potential conflicts during negotiation of the CBA.
Even if a CBA does not anticipate such conflicts, parties to a CBA should
negotiate over the provision of an individual accommodation which affects
terms and conditions of employment of an employee with a disability or
other unionized employees.
Why should the parties to a CBA bargain about accommodations?
After all, if neither party requests to bargain over a topic, the NLRA does
not require bargaining. This section outlines why it is in the best interest of
the employer, the union, and employees with disabilities for the parties to
incorporate both exceptions and a process for addressing requests for
accommodation in their CBA, and to bargain over individual request for
accommodation. Only where the parties fail to reach an agreement should
the court reviewing the ADA claim for an accommodation “balance the
disabled employee’s right to a reasonable accommodation against the
hardship that would result” from varying from the terms of the CBA.224
Negotiation allows the union to “play a constructive role in
suggesting alternative accommodations while limiting adverse effects on
the interests of the other workers,” enabling “all employees to receive the
223. Id.
224. McDevitt, supra note 29, at 387-88.
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maximum protection of both the ADA and the NLRA collective bargaining
process.”225 Only with “ongoing dialogue between all affected parties—the
disabled individual, the union, and the employer who has the burden to
provide a reasonable accommodation—can the objectives of the ADA be
effectively realized.”226 Recognizing and resolving potential conflicts
between accommodations and the provisions of a CBA would protect
employers from allegations of direct dealing, while providing unions with
the opportunity to help craft accommodations that protect the interests of
all members of the bargaining unit.227
Despite its potential benefits, many parties to CBAs do not routinely
bargain about accommodation issues - only twelve percent of private
employers have reported using unions to resolve disability issues.228 Even
so, some CBAs reflect this opportunity to bargain over accommodations
for employees with disabilities. For example, one CBA qualified the
hospital employer’s obligation to “abide by” all state and federal
nondiscrimination laws with the agreement that:
[T]he Hospital shall be permitted to take any and all actions
necessary to comply with the [ADA] and to avoid liability under
the provisions of said Act. If such actions necessitate violation of
a provision of this Agreement, then the parties agree to bargain
with regard to the effect of such action on other bargaining unit
employees.229
Similarly, another hospital promised to “take reasonable steps to
provide reasonable accommodation to disabled workers and applicants as
required by the [ADA]... [s]hould such accommodation have an effect on
bargaining unit members, the Hospital shall first negotiate with the Union
prior to its implementation.”230 These rare CBAs that address issues
surrounding accommodation reflect an important opportunity for both
employers and unions.
In contrast to labor negotiators in the United States, the International
Labor Organization (ILO) has long recommended that unions defend the
rights of employees with disabilities, because of their “sensitivity to the
issue,... their own consciousness of all that is at stake if such groups are
marginalized,... [and] their very willingness to perceive their own advocacy
as central to their role as a key social partner,” as well as their “knowledge

225. O’Melveny, supra note 34, at 226.
226. Id. at 248 (emphasis omitted).
227. Pritchard, supra note 30, at 409.
228. Hoffman, supra note 77, at 324.
229. Collective Bargaining Negot. & Cont (BNA), supra note 168 at 106.07 (illustrating
the CBA between Sacred Heart General Hospital and Oregon Nurses Association [Ind.]).
230. Id. (depicting CBA between Cape Cod Hospital and Service Employees).
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of the field, networking capacity, weight in labour circles and their
legitimacy.”231 Recognizing the potential for conflict between interests of
employees with and without disabilities, ILO Convention 159 states that
“[s]pecial positive measures aimed at effective equality of opportunity and
treatment between disabled workers and other workers shall not be
regarded as discriminating against other workers.”232
Similarly, ILO Recommendation #168 specifically encourages
employers and unions to “adopt a policy for the promotion of training and
suitable employment of disabled persons on an equal footing with other
workers” and “promote the integration or reintegration of disabled persons
in enterprises,” including the provision of rehabilitation services under the
authority of collectively bargained agreements.233 For years, CBAs in
Europe have incorporated supports for employees with disabilities, with the
aim of ensuring “that workers with disabilities can play their full part in the
workplace, the union and society at large.”234 For example, a Norwegian
union placed emphasis on opportunities for employees with disabilities to
effectuate a “change in attitude... to include persons with disabilities in the
workplace.”235 This same approach could go far in opening up employment
opportunities for people with disabilities in the United States.
A. Benefits of the Negotiation Process
The ADA supports participatory justice.236 As noted by one expert,
process is so important to disability rights that “the process surrounding
compliance and the expanding of what compliance actually means cannot
be left to chance or individual interpretation when problems arise.”237 This
231. Trade Union Action: Integrating Disabled Persons into Working Life, LABOUR
EDUCATION
vi,
13
(1998),
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/@ed_dialogue/@actrav/documents/publication/w
cms_111497.pdf [https://perma.cc/MLC5-5BNW].
232. Convention Concerning Vocation Rehabilitation and Employment (Disabled
Persons), art. 4, June 22, 1983, 1401 U.N.T.S. 235.
233. Trade Union Action, supra note 231, at 32-37.
234. Ian Graham, Unions and Disability-doing MORE, TRADE UNIONS AND WORKERS
WITH DISABILITIES: PROMOTING DECENT WORK, COMBATING DISCRIMINATION, Feb. 1, 2004,
at 23, 28.
235. Lene Olsen, Inclusive Workplaces-Norway’s Tripartite Agreement, TRADE UNIONS
AND
WORKERS WITH DISABILITIES: PROMOTING DECENT WORK, COMBATING
DISCRIMINATION, Feb. 1, 2004, at 33, 36.
236. Sharona Hoffman, Corrective Justice and Title I of the ADA, 52 AM. U. L. REV.
1213, 1217 (2003) [hereinafter Hoffman, Corrective Justice].
237. Basas, supra note 6, at 829. See also Alexandra Kalev et al., Best Practices or Best
Guesses? Assessing the Efficacy of Corporate Affirmative Action and Diversity Policies, 71
AM. SOC. REV. 589, 591-93 (2006) (outlining various strategies that organizations use to
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process of determining which accommodations are reasonable must be
transparent, rather than based on “a hunch or a will that something be done
or avoided.”238
Given the importance of process, collective bargaining over individual
employees’ rights such as an accommodation “provides a democratic
experience for workers and requires them to interact with one another
creating a more communal system which benefits all of society.”239
Regardless of the outcome, a fair process to determine the reasonableness
of a request for accommodation will support great acceptance of the
outcome by the employee with a disability.240
In addition, the process used to address accommodation requests can
enhance coworker acceptance of, and even support for accommodations,241
which can be important to the future success of the person requesting the
accommodation.242 Procedural justice will more likely be perceived where
the rules for accommodation decisions are in line with workplace norms
and values, and are consistently applied based on accurate information, bias
is suppressed, the reasons behind accommodation decisions are
communicated to others, and anyone with an interest has a voice in
decisions about accommodations that will affect them.243 Procedural
fairness is more evident where the parties have adhered to objective rules
and organizational factors, including past provision of accommodations,
job flexibility, treatment of employees as individuals and employee
voice.244 Coworker perceptions of procedural fairness can even overcome

increase diversity, suggesting that the most useful approaches were implementing
committees, formal practices, and diversity managers, rather than focusing on mere
education about the elimination of bias); Hoffman, supra note 77, at 339 (finding that open
dialogue between employees and decision makers is essential in determining appropriate
accommodations).
238. Basas, supra note 4, at 112.
239. Ann C. Hodges, The Limits of Multiple Rights and Remedies: A Call for Revisiting
the Law of the Workplace, 22 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 601, 614 (2004-5) [hereinafter
Hodges, The Limits of Multiple Rights].
240. O’Brien, supra note 142, at 139.
241. Lauren B. Gates, Workplace Accommodation as a Social Process, 10 J. OF
OCCUPATIONAL REHABILITATION 85, 86 (2000); Adrienne Colella et al., Factors Affecting
Coworkers’ Procedural Justice Inferences of the Workplace Accommodations of Employees
with Disabilities. 57 PERSONELL PSYCHOL. 1, 2 (2004).
242. Adrienne Colella, Coworker Distributive Fairness Judgments of the Workplace
Accommodation of Employees with Disabilities, 26 ACAD. OF MGMT. REV. 100, 101 (2001)
[hereinafter Colella, Coworker Distributive].
243. Colella et al, supra note 241, at 5.
244. Debra A. Dunstan & Ellen Maceachen, A Theorhetical Model of Co-worker
Responses to Work Reintegration Processes, 24 J. OF OCCUPATIONAL. REHABILITATION 189,
193 (2014).
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perceptions of some distributive unfairness.245
Without negotiation, procedural justice may be hard to achieve for coworkers affected by an accommodation, and co-workers have neither a
legal right nor sufficient knowledge to exercise their voices in such a
process.246 Moreover, because such decisions are individualized, coworkers may not perceive a consistency in procedures and outcomes of
requests for accommodation.247 Through negotiation, union involvement in
discussions regarding accommodations may be an important means of
gaining greater coworker support for the accommodation by increasing
their perceptions of procedural justice.248 As explained above, the NLRA
provides the right to negotiate about any accommodations which affect the
organization’s terms and conditions of employment that could increase coworkers’ perceptions of employee voice. Even the availability of a
grievance procedure to record disagreement with an accommodation can
increase perceptions of procedural justice.249
Overall, union involvement in a relatively more formalized decision–
making process increases perceptions of procedural justice.250 Perceptions
of procedural justice can also be enhanced by the involvement of union
representatives with specialized knowledge about both the ADA and the
particular workplace. As a repeat participant in the process of negotiating
accommodations, unions can gain and apply knowledge about the right to
accommodations under the ADA. Union involvement in requests for
accommodation, as well as a general support for employing people with
disabilities, may help co-workers to have more contact with employees
with disabilities, which can in turn increase their perceptions of procedural
fairness.251 A history of flexibility in how work is performed and
accommodations are provided, which could be facilitated or enhanced by
bargaining, can also increase perceptions of procedural fairness, because of
more positive perceptions of consistency.252 It should be noted, however,
that a union’s involvement may not change the perception of procedural
justice that is dependent on a coworker’s perceptions of organizational
support or individual level of concern for social justice.253
The nature of the employee’s disability can be an important factor in
245. Colella et al, supra note 241, at 4 (explaining how procedural justice implicates
moderate effects of distributive justice judgments).
246. Colella, supra note 242, at 102; Colella et al, supra note 225, at 6.
247. Colella et al, supra note 225, at 6.
248. Hodges, The Americans with Disabilities Act, supra note 17, at 610.
249. Colella et al, supra note 241, at 15.
250. Id. at 15-16.
251. Id. at 12.
252. Id. at 13-15.
253. Id. at 11-12.
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the acceptance of accommodation for him or her,254 and unions may be
helpful in convincing co-workers that an accommodation is justified by the
employee’s condition. If the employee with a disability is willing to share
that information with the union representative, even though they might not
care to share it with others, co-workers may be more apt to believe that the
accommodation is necessary and, therefore, procedurally fair.
Union representation can also increase perceptions of distributive
justice among co-workers of the employee seeking an accommodation,
which can be important to their acceptance and support of the
accommodation.255 The accommodations concerning the allocation of
resources can seemingly undermine distributive justice. Since the union
represents all other members of a bargaining unit as well as the person with
a disability, their involvement can help the union members accept the
fairness of the distribution of privileges or resources involved in an
accommodation.
A union’s involvement that expands the range of accommodations
considered can also enhance distributive justice.256 The union may suggest
alternative accommodations that would not conflict with a CBA provision
or would otherwise have less of an impact on the interests of other
employees.257 This potential for negotiation has been recognized by the
ILO, which has stated that “unions with disabled workers should be
involved in the accommodation process together with the disabled worker,
the employer and other co-workers, if appropriate, to find reasonable
solutions that will accommodate the worker’s needs without imposing a
disproportionate burden on the employer.”258
Virtually all CBA’s include a grievance and arbitration process, and
most permit grievances over any interpretation or application of the
contract.259 If the duty to accommodate is clarified in a CBA, an arbitrator
could resolve any specific claim by a person seeking an accommodation or

254. See the confidentiality condition for procedural justice noted by Colella, Id. at 3, 6
(noting that while the ADA requires confidentiality surrounding an employee’s disability
and accommodations, some disabilities are readily apparent in the workplace regardless; the
ADA, however, provides privacy protections requiring that disability information should not
be released except on a need-to-know basis, which helps to protect the rationale for the
decision upon accommodation).
255. Colella, supra note 242, at 102.
256. Hodges, The Americans with Disabilities Act, supra note 17, at 609-10; Pritchard,
supra note 30, at 404 (asserting that a union should ensure that proposed accommodations
do not harm interests of other members of a bargaining unit).
257. Daly-Rooney, supra note 39, at 410.
258. ILO, TRADE UNIONS AND WORKERS WITH DISABILITIES: PROMOTING DECENT WORK,
COMBATING DISCRIMINATION 11 (2004).
259. BNA, Basic Patterns, supra note 62 at 33.
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another employee alleging that an accommodation infringes on his or her
rights. As noted regarding the arbitration of Title VII claims, arbitration
“has the potential to accommodate the competing interests of employers
and employees.”260 Through arbitration, employers can avoid the costs of
litigation, as well as negative public attention, and enjoy the finality of an
arbitration award, since courts tend to defer to the parties’ grievance and
arbitration process to resolve such issues.261
In lieu of relying on the typical grievance/arbitration system
contained in most CBA’s, the parties to a CBA could agree to an
alternative process to resolve issues surrounding an employee’s request
for an accommodation. For example, a CBA between ArcelorMittal USA
and the Steelworkers provided for the creation of a civil rights committee,
including two union and two management representatives to “review and
investigate matters involving civil rights and attempt to resolve them.”262
More specifically, a CBA with the Pacific Maritime Association created a
joint labor-management committee to determine which employees were
entitled to placement preference due to their disability.263 Regardless of
its specific form, alternative dispute resolution can result in less litigation
under the ADA and broader availability of accommodation for employees
with disabilities.
The negotiation process, as well as reliance on alternative dispute
resolution, could lead to great implementation and acceptance of
accommodations without placing a burden on co-workers or the
employer.
Beyond these general benefits, negotiating over
accommodations can provide benefits which are specific to employers,
unions and employees with disabilities, as outlined below.
B. Benefits for Employers
In addition to the general advantages of bargaining over
accommodations outlined above, employers stand to gain additional
benefits from bargaining over the provision of accommodations.
Employers can engage in both broad and individualized bargaining over
accommodations to reduce potential liability under the ADA, helping to

260. Stephen A. Plass, Arbitrating, Waiving and Deferring Title VII Claims, 58 BROOK.
L. REV. 779, 826 (1992-93).
261. See, e.g., Soone v. Kyo-Ya Co., 353 F. Supp. 2d 1107 (D. Ha. 2005) (holding that
courts should typically defer to arbitration decisions and review settlement mechanisms
without dealing with the merits of the dispute where a CBA includes arbitration provisions).
262. BNA, Basic Patterns, supra note 62.
263. Willis v. Pac. Mar. Ass’n., 244 F.3d 675 (9th Cir. 2001).
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clarify the “uncertain” scope of statutory rights.264 Reasonable
accommodation in particular has been labeled an “elusive concept,” and
employers are arguably left “dizzied” by its ambiguity.265 This uncertainty
stems in large part from the fact that an accommodation may be reasonable
for some, but not other employers. Under the Supreme Court’s case-bycase approach for ADA claims, employers face the prospect of litigation
arising from every decision regarding an accommodation.266 Consequently,
employers are being “forced to spend even more time managing medical
leave and accommodation issues, which drastically impacts their ability to
manage day-to-day operations.”267 Given the Supreme Court’s deference to
CBA language in Barnett, negotiation of CBA language defining what is
and is not reasonable in a particular workplace, as well as negotiation over
an individual request for accommodation, should help insulate an employer
from potential liability under the ADA.
In addition to providing clarity, negotiation over accommodations
can also help address potential liability in situations where a requested
accommodation potentially conflicts with a CBA provision. Without
negotiation, an employer could be forced to “choose between protecting
and advancing the interests of the individual or the interests of the
collective group.”268
A unilateral response to such a request for
accommodation could expose the employer to an unfair labor charge based
on its failure to bargain.269 If the requested accommodation potentially
conflicts with a CBA provision, the employer could face liability for failing
to accommodate or for violating the CBA.270 Bargaining will help shield
the employer from ADA claims,271 particularly if the negotiation includes
the employee seeking the accommodation as well as the union
representing her. As noted by one commentator, “both the ADA and
NLRA serve compelling interests and protect legitimate constituent
concerns.”272 Adherence to one, while violating the other, could subject an

264. Rabin, supra note 46, at 246. See also Wesley A. Scroggins, The Measurement and
Structural Modeling of the Reasonableness of Workplace Accommodation, 19 EMP. RESP. &
RTS. J. 279, 280-82 (2007) (noting that courts have difficulty defining what constitutes a
reasonable accommodation).
265. Basas, supra note 4, at 60, 75.
266. Rabin, supra note 46, at 273.
267. Mindy Toran, Special Report; Courts, Employers Still at Odds over Application of
ADA in the Workplace, 19 WORKER’S COMPENSATION REP. (LRP Publ’ns., Palm Beach
Gardens, Fla. Apr. 2008).
268. Hankinson, supra note 89, at 266.
269. Dubault, supra note 48, at 1292.
270. Stahlhut, supra note 38, at 74.
271. Hodges, The Americans with Disabilities Act, supra note 17, at 619.
272. Hankinson, supra note 89, at 246.
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employer to damages and attorney fees.
Beyond avoiding liability, bargaining for clarity regarding what
accommodations should be provided can help employers resolve claims
more effectively. Generally, collective bargaining helps to resolve
disputes without litigation, because a collective bargaining relationship
allows for quick intervention, low-level resolution of problems and a long
term relational view to resolving disputes.273 Through bargaining,
employers can be directed to address accommodation requests based on
the facts related to the burden the accommodation would impose.274
Negotiation also can benefit employers because “a system of
collectively negotiated benefits offers more flexibility to employers than
mandated legal rights applicable to all.”275 Employers may worry that
provision of an accommodation for one will inhibit flexibility in
addressing future requests for accommodation. This concern can be
addressed through negotiation. For example, two arbitration awards
honored CBA provisions that an individual accommodation would not be
precedent setting.276
In addition to resolving conflicts, ADA compliance through
negotiation can benefit employers, since changes implemented as
accommodations can also enhance the productivity, job tenure and
absenteeism rates of all employees.277 Accommodating employees with
disabilities can help retain employees known to have low turnover rates,
as well as equivalent absenteeism and productivity compared to nondisabled workers.278
Moreover, negotiation over an individual
accommodation can avoid the discharge of productive employees with
disabilities, as well as other departure costs associated with losing the
employee with a disability who cannot remain employed without the
accommodation. 279
Productivity can also be enhanced, since negotiation over
accommodations should mitigate negative attitudes among other employees
273. Ellen Dannin, Forum: At 70, Should the National Labor Relations Act Be Retired?:
NLRA Values, Labor Values, American Values, 26 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 223, 258-59
(2005).
274. Basas, supra note 4, at 110, 112 (focusing on facts removes influence of “attitudinal
barriers and gut reactions to disability”).
275. Ann C. Hodges, The Limits of Multiple Rights and Remedies: A Call for Revisiting
the Law of the Workplace, 22 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 601, 614 (2005).
276. Interstate Brands Corp., 113 LA 161 (1999); Techneglass, Inc., 120 LA 722
(2004).
277. Hoffman, Corrective Justice, supra note 236, at 1279.
278. Id.
279. Nicole B. Porter, Reasonable Burdens: Resolving the Conflict Between Disabled
Employees and Their Co-workers, 34 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 313, 324 (2007).
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who feel that an accommodation has adversely affected them. Employers
may be concerned that an accommodation will be viewed as favoritism by
other employees.280
Union input prior to the provision of the
accommodation should help to address a perception of unfair advantage,
since the union is charged with representation of all employees. If the
accommodation does not directly infringe on other employees’ rights,
employers should be able to address any morale issues arising from an
accommodation through awareness training and supervisor oversight.281
Acceptance of such training should be enhanced by union support.
The benefits of providing accommodations are demonstrated by the
fact that at least some employers have been willing to accommodate
employees who are not protected by the ADA, if the cost was sufficiently
low.282 Accommodation for one person with a disability often benefits
others, particularly where the accommodation is generalizable, durable,
and visible.283 Negotiation about accommodations can help to spread
their benefits among more workers, compared to individual enforcement
of ADA rights, which may only affect those with the most resources, the
greatest persistence or the most obviously reasonable requests.284
C. Benefits for Unions
Collective bargaining agreements can be characterized as both the
source of workplace rules and as “expressions of workplace values.”285
Generally, unions can bargain for conditions of employment that fit the
needs of a particular workplace, as well as negotiate necessary changes.286
Such negotiations include flexible internal workplace systems to deal with
discrimination, which can be beneficial for all employees, not just those
280. See Kathy Charmaz, Disclosing Illness and Disability in the Workplace, 3(1/2) J.
INT’L EDUC. BUS. 6-19 (2010) (discussing the dilemmas of disability disclosure for
employers).
281. See Key, supra note 84, at 1034 (providing employer strategies for maintaining
employee morale).
282. See, e.g.., Hoffman, supra note 77, at 326 (analyzing empirical data regarding the
likelihood of employer to grant accommodation request under various circumstances).
283. See Elizabeth F. Emens, Integrating Accommodation, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 839, 841,
846, 895 (2008) (discussing third-party benefits of granting disability accommodations in
the workplace).
284. See Hodges, The Americans with Disabilities Act, supra note 17, at 615, 618
(discussing conflicts between accommodations and collective bargaining agreements).
285. Basas, A Collective Good, supra note 6, at 811-12 (discussing the “belief-change
theory” that regulations can change norms and decision making).
286. See Hodges, The Americans with Disabilities Act, supra note 17, at 618
(explaining that, even before the enactment of the ADA, unions frequently negotiated with
employers).
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with disabilities.287
Collective representation gives relatively greater power to workers
and is associated with greater individual rights, compared to a pure
individual rights system.288 A union’s involvement in the ADA’s
interactive process “would offset the structural disadvantage that a single
employee has against a large [employer],” based on its structural power and
its ability to gain information through experience with other employees
with disabilities.289 As noted by Marc Blondel, Worker Member of the ILO
Governing Body and former General Secretary of the French labor
confederation CGT-Force, “[d]isabled workers’ struggle is every worker’s
struggle. This is not about pity or doing good. It’s about fighting for the
dignity of all workers.”290
Rights for persons with disabilities are sometimes discounted as
something only needed by “someone else.”291 Both unions and employees
should recognize that all employees run the risk of becoming disabled at
some point, because of an injury or illness arising in the workplace or
beyond.292 In the words of Ruth O’Brien, “what benefits one helps all.”293
Problem solving for a particular group, such as employees with disabilities,
“can trigger systemic changes that simultaneously address individual
concerns and yield systemic improvements that benefit a broader group.”294
More specifically, accommodations can benefit both able-bodied
287. See id. at 614-621 (identifying and analyzing policies that resolve the conflicts
between disabled and abled employees); see also O’Melveny, supra note 34, at 220
(discussing the expansion of disability accommodations and requirements under the ADA).
See generally Floyd D. Weatherspoon, Incorporating Mandatory Arbitration Employment
Clauses into Collective Bargaining Agreements: Challenges and Benefits to the Employer
and the Union, 38 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1025, 1035 (2014) (advocating for individuals’ rights
will benefit all union members).
288. See Hodges, The Americans with Disabilities Act, supra note 17, at 614.
289. O’Brien, supra note 142, at 132.
290. Luc Demaret, Disability – the Human Cost of Discrimination, TRADE UNIONS AND
WORKERS WITH DISABILITIES: PROMOTING DECENT WORK, COMBATING DISCRIMINATION, 11,
16 (2004).
291. Basas, A Collective Good, supra note 6, at 843.
292. Hodges, The Americans with Disabilities Act, supra note 17, at 619. See also
O’Brien, BODIES IN REVOLT, supra note 139, at 115 (suggesting that few workers will not
experience a serious injury or illness over their lifetime).
293. O’Brien, O’Brien, BODIES IN REVOLT, supra note 139, at 119, 138 (arguing that
accommodations represent needs that every employee may someday have).
294. Susan Sturm, Response, Designing the Architecture for Integrating
Accommodation: An Institutional Commentary, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 11, 13-14 (2008),
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5404b603e4b0c1de72655e7e/t/540f28e6e4b03c9d357
c03b9/1410279654077/Designing+the+Architecture+for+Integrating+Accommodation+An+Institutionalist+Commentary.pdf [https://perma.cc/C5NH-2LUP] [hereinafter Sturm,
Designing the Architecture].

2016]

BARGAINING FOR ACCOMMODATIONS

197

employees and employees who suffer from limitations that do not rise to
the level of the ADA’s coverage,295 especially where those
accommodations are generalizable, durable, and visible. For example, a
request for an accommodation could prompt technological innovation or
beneficial modifications to the workplace.296
In addition, an
accommodation of an employee with a disability may make others’ work
easier or more enjoyable.297
Beyond potential benefits for able-bodied employees, unions can
strengthen their organizations by advocating for accommodations. To
mobilize workers and impact public perception, unions need to expand
beyond the narrow aspect of workers’ economic identities.298 From 1998 to
as recently as 2009, discussions of unions and diversity did not
acknowledge people with disabilities as having an interest deserving
protection.299
Inclusion of disability rights in union agendas can be seen as “a way
of voicing greater concerns about what counts as diversity, what it means to
create life-span career paths for all workers, and how issues of health
equity are intimately intertwined with both public policy and
employment.”300 Moreover, allowing such employer discretion could be
an effective way for an employer to undermine a union and reduce
bargaining unit solidarity.301
The individual analysis and treatment required under the ADA
necessitates the exercise of a great deal of discretion, including providing
accommodations that conflict with standard policy or practice.302 Such
295. Emens, supra note 283, at 842. See also Colella, supra note 242, at 18 (stating that
accommodations can have beneficial effects for coworkers).
296. See id., supra note 283, at 914 (discussing ways in which design and disclosure of
accommodations affect the extent of their benefits to third parties).
297. See Colella, supra note 242, at 19 (acknowledging scenarios where the outcome of
accommodation had positive outcomes for all workers).
298. Marion Crain & Ken Matheny, Labor’s Identity Crisis, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1767, 1769
(2001) (discussing the shortcomings of unions efforts). See also O’Brien, BODIES IN
REVOLT, supra note 139, at 118 (proposing that the ADA could help labor unions carve out
a niche representing employees with disabilities).
299. Susan Woods, Unions, People, and Diversity: Building Solidarity Across a Diverse
Membership, 7 DIVERSITY FACTOR 38, 40 (1998) (discussing union movements to increase
diversity of membership); Michael Yates, Race, Gender, Ethnicity, and Sexual Orientation,
WHY UNIONS MATTER 144-48 (Monthly Review Press 2009).
300. Basas, A Collective Good, supra note 6, at 845. See also Marion Crain, Strategies
for Union Relevance in a Post-Industrial World: Reconceiving Antidiscrimination Rights as
Collective Rights, 57 LAB. L.J. 158, 168 (2006) (advocating for individual rights that will
benefit unions).
301. Woods, supra note 299, at 40.
302. Shapiro, supra note 86, at 4, 30. See also O’Brien, BODIES IN REVOLT, supra note
139, at 112 (accommodation requests undercut managerial power, including determining
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discretion opens the door to decisions that reflect, express, or produce
outcomes that are biased against members of protected groups.303 Broad
discretion for the employer to approve accommodations based on its
interpretation of potential conflict with a CBA may not best protect the
interests of the employee with a disability or other employees represented
by that union.304 While some have concluded that the ADA can only be
implemented by undermining traditional labor goals, because union’s goal
is to limit an employer’s exercise of discretion,305 this is not necessarily
true. It is a union’s failure to assert its right to bargain regarding
accommodations that allows employers to “deal directly with individual
workers on matters vital to their economic well-being as long as some other
aspect of the worker’s identity protected through antidiscrimination statutes
is involved.”306
Some CBA’s do nothing to limit the employer’s discretion in making
decisions about the reasonableness of accommodation requests. For
example, an AFSCME CBA allowed the employer to determine which
duties were essential,307 which can be an important factor in determining
the reasonableness of an accommodation request. Similarly, other CBA’s
allow the employer to unilaterally reassign an employee or provide some
other accommodation, despite potential conflict with the CBA.308 Instead of
allowing the employer such discretion, the CBA could limit an employer’s
discretion in making such factual determinations that can in turn determine
the reasonableness of an accommodation.
Unions may find it difficult to convince members of a bargaining unit
that advocating for another employee’s rights is in their best interest.309 If
the impact on other unit members is severe, the union may reject a
proposed accommodation as “being unduly disruptive to the legitimate
rights and interests of the other bargaining unit members under the

what are essential job duties).
303. Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural
Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 485 (2001) [hereinafter Sturm, Second Generation]
(discussing the impact of employer discretion in decision making).
304. See Paul L. Nevin, Note, “No Longer Caught in the Middle?”: Barnett Seniority
System Ruling Eliminates Managements’ Dilemma with ADA Reasonable Accommodation,
41 BRANDEIS L.J. 199, 215 (2002) (discussing how employer discretion may undermine
union action).
305. Shapiro, supra note 86, at 4, 41.
306. Crain & Matheny, supra note 298, at 1769-70.
307. AFSCME Council 14, Lab. Arb. Rep. Supp. (BNA) 117294 (1996) (Berquist, Arb.).
308. Maintenance & Industrial Services, 116 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 293 (2001) (Hart,
Arb.); Commercial Cleaning Sys., 122 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1383 (2006) (McCurdy, Arb.).
309. See Weatherspoon, supra note 287, at 1035 (advocating for individuals’ rights will
benefit all union members).
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collective bargaining agreement.”310 But it is the union, not the employer,
who should make this initial determination. The union is in the best
position to balance competing interests arising within its bargaining unit.
As noted by one expert, at least some burden on other employees (who
lose or delay rights under the CBA) can be justified by the ADA’s goal of
increasing the independence of persons with disabilities, and the benefits
and efficiencies of retaining the employee with a disability.311
Tension between interests of employees with and without disabilities
may be heightened where the requested accommodation is seen as a
limitation or infringement on the rights or interests of other members of
the bargaining unit.312 Yet “[m]aking hard choices is nothing new for
unions, which must constantly choose between conflicting interests.... The
collective nature of the endeavor calls for the sacrifice of individual gains
in the interest of the common welfare.”313 While employers tend to focus
on productivity concerns,314 unions are in the unique position to consider a
variety of potentially conflicting factors such as the nature of the right at
stake; the importance of seniority under the CBA, both in general and in a
particular circumstance, and the relative interests of the employee with a
disability and co-workers.315 Inclusion of a union in decision-making
regarding request for accommodations would also “foster a cooperative
atmosphere in the workplace” and take advantage of the union’s expertise
in “balancing the diverse interests of their members.”316
With union involvement, a CBA can help to define generally which
accommodations will be deemed reasonable in a particular workplace. For
instance, the Department of Housing and Urban Development’s agreement
with the American Federation of Government employees includes
examples of what constitutes reasonable accommodation, including job
restructuring, schedule changes, and the provision of readers and
interpreters.317 Similarly, a United Steelworkers agreement stipulated that
changes in schedule may be considered to be reasonable
310. McDevitt, supra note 29, at 377.
311. See Porter, Martinizing Title I, supra note 69, at 575-76 (discussing the difficulties
surrounding the reassignment accommodation).
312. See Weatherspoon, supra note 287, at 1070 (explaining the difficulties in balancing
rights among union members).
313. Rabin, supra note 46, at 253-54.
314. See Ida Seing, et al., Policy and Practice of Work Ability: A Negotiation of
Responsibility in Organizing Return to Work, 22 J. OCCUP. REHAB. 553, 561 (2012)
(evaluating constraints on employers when making worker accommodations).
315. See Daly-Rooney, supra note 39, at 415 (discussing multifactor tests examined by
employers when considering employee accommodation requests).
316. Dubault, supra note 48, at 1294.
317. Dept. of HUD, 116 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1364 (2002) (McReynolds, Arb.).
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accommodations.318
In balancing the interests of the employee seeking an accommodation
against the interests of other members of the bargaining unit, unions may
fear that an accommodation which affects others’ interests may give rise to
a claim that the union has breached its duty of fair representation. There is
some inherent tension between collective and individual interests.319 One
expert even went so far as to state that “[i]f the rights of the other
bargaining-unit employees will be adversely affected, the union cannot
agree to such a proposal without violating its duty of fair representation to
those workers under the NLRA.” 320 This is a broad overstatement of a
union’s duty of fair representation (DFR) in negotiations.
DFR only requires that a union avoid irrational or discriminatory
conduct during negotiations or other representation of members of the
bargaining unit.321 An error of judgment or “mere negligence or tactical
error” by the union does not establish a breach of the duty of fair
representation.322 A union need not provide the opportunity to arbitrate
every grievance, even if union representatives lack the expertise to evaluate
the merits of a claim.323 Like representation of members with competing
interests, bargaining necessarily requires compromise across the interests of
those members.324 The Supreme Court has noted that “[a]ny substantive
examination of a union’s performance must be highly deferential,
recognizing the wide latitude that negotiators need for the effective
performance of their bargaining responsibilities.”325 Given the “wide
latitude” given to unions in fulfilling their responsibilities,326 courts have
given unions the discretion to refuse to pursue grievances by members with
318. See CH2M-WG Idaho, 134 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 876 (2014) (DiFalco,
Arb.)(addressing employee accommodations in a wrongful termination action).
319. See Hodges, Protecting Unionized Employees, supra note 17, at 144 (discussing
conflicts of interest that may arise between employee and union).
320. O’Melveny, supra note 34, at 232.
321. See, e.g., Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 190 (1967) (stating, in dicta, that “[a] breach
of the statutory duty of fair representation occurs only when a union’s conduct toward a
member of the collective bargaining unit is arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith);
Emswiler v. CSX Transp., Inc., 691 F.3d 782, 793 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Vaca v. Sipes).
322. Martinez v. Caravan Transp., Inc., 253 F. Supp. 2d 403, 411 (E.D.N.Y. 2003). See
also Gorham v. Transit Workers Union of Am., No. 98 Civ. 313, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
3573, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. 1999), aff’d without opin., 205 F.3d 1322 (2d Cir. 2000) (stating that
“tactical errors are insufficient to show a breach of duty of fair representation”).
323. See Hodges, Protecting Unionized Employees, supra note 17, at 145, 148-49
(expanding on the duty of fair representation).
324. See Air Line Pilots Assoc. Int’l v. O’Neill, 499 U.S. 65, 81 (1991) (holding that “[a]
rational compromise on the initial allocation of the positions was not invidious
‘discrimination’ of the kind prohibited by the duty of fair representation.”).
325. Id. at 78.
326. Spellacy v. Airline Pilots Ass’n-Int’l, 156 F.3d 120, 126 (2d Cir. 1998).
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disabilities.327 It is important to keep in mind that a DFR claim cannot arise
based on rights such as those found in the ADA, which do not derive from
a union’s status as the exclusive representative.328 In contrast, recent
recognition that a union may be liable for discrimination under the ADA,
even if it has not breached its duty of fair representation,329 provides
support for a union’s attention to its obligation to represent employees who
seek accommodation under the ADA.
The ability of a union to explicitly waive members’ rights to pursue a
statutory claim outside of arbitration provides incentive for unions to
negotiate no more than a vague nondiscrimination clause, so that the
individual employee’s rights are not waived.330 However, the waiver of an
employee’s right to a judicial forum to enforce statutory rights is not a
mandatory subject of bargaining,331 thereby preventing an employer from
conditioning other CBA provisions on a union’s agreement to waive
employees’ access to the judicial forum to enforce statutory rights.332 This
also means, however, that employers can seek such waivers without
consultation with a representing union. Some have argued that “[w]here a
subject of bargaining would otherwise be permissive, it may become
mandatory when it is so intertwined with a mandatory subject of bargaining
that it vitally affects the terms and conditions of employment of the
employees.”333 Unlike discharges, however, a failure to accommodate may
327. See, e.g., Reddick v. Yale Univ., No. 3:13-cv-01140-WWE, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
157065, at *23-24 (D.D.Ct. Nov. 20, 2015) (finding that plaintiff could not show violation
of CBA); Wood v. Crown Redi-Mix, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
16461, at *1107-08 (S.D. Iowa, Aug. 29, 2002), aff’d 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 16137 (8th
Cir. Iowa, Aug. 7, 2003) (holding that plaintiff could not show breach of CBA sufficient to
justify pursuing a grievance).
328. See Rabin, supra note 46, at 174 (discussing the strains of the current legal model of
union representation).
329. See, e.g., Banks v. Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs Local 99, No. 15-cv-01598
(APM), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97902, at *10-13 (D.D.C July 27, 2016) (discussing union
liability under the Title VII and the ADA); Garity v. APWU Nat’l Labor Org., No. 1315195, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 12380, at *39-41 (9th Cir. July 5, 2016) (stating that a
plaintiff may still have a Title VII or an ADA claim even if she cannot prove a violation of
the labor laws).
330. See Weatherspoon, supra note 287, at 1035 (discussing difficulties unions face in
negotiating waiver clauses with members).
331. See, Air Line Pilots Ass’n, Int’l v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 199 F.3d 477, 484-85 (D.C.
Cir. 1999) (finding that statutory rights need not be part of the bargaining process between
union and employee); Kolman/Athey Div. of Athey Prods. Corp., 303 N.L.R.B. 92 (1991)
(discussing the terms of employer-employee bargain).
332. Ann C. Hodges, Arbitration of Statutory Claims in the Unionized Workplace: Is
Bargaining with the Union Required? 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 513, 531-32 (2001)
[hereinafter Hodges, Arbitration of Statutory Claims](discussing the implications for
employers when employees waive their rights).
333. Id. at 546-47.
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not be directly addressed by other provisions of the CBA.
A study of one hundred public sector CBAs found that thirteen
adopted a “community stakeholder” approach, with some including specific
language regarding union involvement in accommodations.334
This
sometimes included union representation for employees seeking
accommodations, and the union and employer’s agreement to consider
accommodation requests and attempt to place that employee upon return
from disability-related leave.
Union involvement in bargaining regarding accommodations can also
affect the employer’s undue hardship defense, which allows employers to
avoid accommodating if it would impose an undue hardship on that
employer.335 Past allowance or provision of the accommodation sought can
undermine an undue hardship defense, since the employer’s past behavior
can be seen as evidence of an absence of hardship.336 Thus, employers
“fear that fulfilling the needs of one employee with a disability could set a
precedent for another employee.”337 A union’s representation of the
collective bargaining unit puts it in a position to bargain on behalf of the
employees who may not need an accommodation now, but could need one
in the future - a need which could be unfulfilled based on the employer’s
earlier handling of similar requests. As noted by Ruth O’Brien, “[w]hen an
employer accommodates one employee, this accommodation represents a
precedent that another employee might profit from in the future.”338
Some unions have recognized the benefits of intentionally
representing bargaining unit members with disabilities. For example, both
“IAM Cares,” sponsored by the International Association of Machinists
and Aerospace Workers (IAM), and a joint effort between IAM and Boeing
Aircraft work to provide retraining and related assistance to employees
with disabilities arising from the workplace.339 Under this agreement,
employees are evaluated individually and provided with appropriate

334. Basas, A Collective Good, supra note 6, at 821.
335. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10); see also Monette v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 90 F.3d
1173, 1183-84 (6th Cir. 1996) (noting that the burden of proof does not shift to the employer
to show lack of undue hardship).
336. See, e.g., Haschmann v. Time Warner Entm’t Co., L.P., 151 F.3d 591, 601-2 (7th
Cir. 1998) (finding that previous leave of 6 months showed that additional leave would not
impose hardship).
337. Ruth
O’Brien,
Symposium:
Subversive
Legacies:
Learning
from
History/Constructing The Future: A Subversive Act: The Americans with Disabilities Act,
Foucault, and an Alternative Ethic of Care at the Global Workplace, 13 TEX. J. WOMEN &
L. 55, 57 (2003) [hereinafter O’Brien, Symposium].
338. O’Brien, BODIES IN REVOLT, supra note 139, at 117.
339. See O’Melveny, supra note 34, at 247 (arguing that benefits arise when unions
represent employees with disabilities).
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accommodations to enable an earlier return to work.340 In the two-year
period following the implementation of this program, both the time lost by
employees with disabilities and workers’ compensation costs were cut in
half in one Boeing division.341 Taking a more expansive approach, in
Canada, the United Steelworkers have adopted a policy to bargain for a
“commitment from the parties to accommodate employees with disabilities
regardless of the cause of the disability, and regardless of whether
temporary or permanent.”342
For the foregoing reasons, unions should consider asserting the right
to bargain over any accommodation that affects a term or condition of
employment or otherwise conflicts with an existing CBA. Bargaining will
help to sustain the union’s importance as an employee representative.
Bargaining over accommodations will protect the interests of all members
of the bargaining unit. Moreover, bargaining to assert one employee’s
ADA rights may benefit other members of the bargaining unit by
improving overall working conditions or establishing a standard of
accommodation for the future.
D. Benefits for Employees with Disabilities
Unions can play a significant part in enforcing rights codified in the
ADA to benefit present and future employees with disabilities.343
Workplace policies and practices, as enumerated in a CBA, can reflect the
corporate culture.344 A culture which values diversity and emphasizes
nondiscrimination has been shown to positively impact people with
disabilities.345 Therefore, inclusion of supportive language in a CBA
should enhance the availability of accommodations for employees with
disabilities.
Beyond its general benefits, a union’s coordination of requests for
340. Jay W. Spechler, REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION: PROFITABLE
THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 46 (St. Lucie Press 1996).

COMPLIANCE

WITH

341. Id.
342. ILO, Trade Unions and Decent Work for People with Disabilities Information
Sheet, http://www.ilo.org/public/english//region/asro/bangkok/ability/download/tufact.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GSJ6-SUKJ]; USW Policy on Disability, UNITED STEEL WORKERS,
http://www.usw.ca/act/activism/human-rights/resources/opening-doors-usw-policy-ondisability-rights [https://perma.cc/6GKT-NC9A].
343. See Hodges, The Americans with Disabilities Act, supra note 17, at 625 (arguing
that union participation is a significant step in eliminating disability discrimination).
344. See Schur, supra note 19, at 12-13 (discussing the impact of corporate policies on
employees with disabilities).
345. Susanne Bruyere, et al., Identity and Disability in the Workplace, 44 WM & MARY
L. REV. 1173, 1187 (2003) (discussing the importance of workplace culture in minimizing
disability impact).
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accommodation can strengthen those requests. As one expert observed, “a
collective of workers making reasonable accommodations requests would
change the environment of an entire workplace.”346 Regarding union
involvement in the enforcement of Title VII, one expert noted that
“[u]nions can help harmonize issues arising under the collective bargaining
agreement with issues arising under employment laws to achieve the
overall good of industrial peace.”347
Bargaining may be more effective in advancing the interests of
employees with disabilities than the law alone. A marriage of labor law
and individual employment laws provides the best opportunity for
improved working conditions.348
Second-generation discrimination
requires a proactive problem-solving approach, rather than a regulatory
system.349 In Canada, for example, the strengthening of the duty to
accommodate is “primarily because of unions” because unions “have the
resources and motivation to push the envelope on this issue.”350 One
Canadian union outlined its responsibilities regarding accommodation to
include insistence “that the employer fulfills its proactive duty to design
workplace requirements and standards so that, from the outset, they do not
discriminate,” and modeling a “problem-solving approach to
accommodation;” the employer and union also review all applicable
standards, in part to assure that “flexibility and a willingness to
accommodate individual needs are built in.”351
Outside of the United States, collective bargaining has played an
important role in the enforcement of rights, “particularly... where
legislation or government programmes are inadequate, or where economic
conditions are such that employers are reluctant to employ people they
perceive as less productive.”352 As explained by Ursula Engelen-Kefer in
reference to new protections for employees with disabilities, “[n]ew law
does not enforce itself. The new rights must be asserted by the people for

346. O’Brien, Symposium supra note 337, at 89.
347. Plass, supra note 260, at 827-28.
348. O’Brien, supra note 142, at 131 (proposing solutions to improve working
conditions).
349. Sturm, Second Generation, supra note 303, at 475 (discussing limitations of a rule
enforcing approach to employment discrimination).
350. National Union of Public and General Employees, Duty to accommodate-big labour
movement victory (Sept. 1, 2010), http://nupge.ca/content/3528/duty-accommodate-biglabour-movement-victory [https://perma.cc/E3UB-3J28].
351. National Union Primer – Duty to accommodate (Nov. 2002),
http://www.nupge.ca/sites/nupge.ca/files/publications/Duty%20to%20Accommodate.pdf
[https://perma.cc/33UK-LZSS].
352. Trade Union Action, supra note 231, at 47.
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whom they were created.”353 At least one expert argues that the law is a
limited means of affecting change, and unions should use it as an “aid to
bargaining” but only as “one piece of the strategy and not the guiding
light.”354 In Britain, for example, it has long been acknowledged that
individual employment disputes are better managed in unionized
environments.355 Similarly, in the early days of the ADA, one study found
that unionized employers were far more likely to comply with the ADA.356
Union representation in the accommodation process can prevent an
employer from supporting only the interests of able-bodied employees who
oppose an accommodation, which can be seen as “perpetuating
discrimination toward persons with disabilities.”357 A stronger union role
can address the ambiguity surrounding the scope of “reasonable
accommodation” that has allowed both employers and courts to “consider
what they find unreasonable about the ADA, people with disabilities, and
their needs.”358
Unions can assist an employee with a disability in the interactive
process that the ADA requires.359 Employees with disabilities often lose
their claims challenging a failure to accommodate because they are blamed
for the breakdown of that negotiation process.360 Unions could help
encourage and facilitate the continuation of the interactive process. Such a
role could be particularly important for employees lacking the ability to
negotiate effectively.361 More importantly, unions can better counter an
employer’s “resistance strategies” used to slow down or avoid the
provision of accommodations, and the potential for retaliation feared by
353. Graham, supra note 234, at 28.
354. Ann C. Hodges, Avoiding Legal Seduction: Reinvigorating the Labor Movement to
Balance Corporate Power, 94 MARQ. L. REV. 889, 896 (2011) [hereinafter Hodges,
Avoiding Legal Seduction].
355. See Anna Pollert, The Unorganized Worker: The Decline in Collectivism and New
Hurdles to Individual Employment Rights, 34 INDUS. L. J. 217, 220 (2005) (discussing laborrelated litigation in Britain).
356. SUSAN SCHURMAN, ET AL, The Role of Unions and Collective Bargaining in
Preventing Work-related Disability 121, 143 in NEW APPROACHES TO DISABILITY IN THE
WORKPLACE (Eds., Terry Thomason, et al. Indus. Relations Research Ass’n 1998).
357. O’Brien, Symposium supra note 337, at 86.
358. Trade Union Action, supra note 231, at 47.
359. Barnett v. U.S. Air, Inc. (Barnett II), 228 F.3d 1105, 1113 (9th Cir. 2000) (stating
that the burden of establishing reasonable accommodations should be on the employer rather
than the employee).
360. Craig Sullivan, The ADA’s Interactive Process, 57 J. OF THE MO. BAR 116, 120
(2001) (stating that an employee’s case will be dismissed if a negotiation breakdown is a
consequence of the employee’s actions).
361. Elizabeth F. Emens, The Sympathetic Discriminator: Mental Illness, Hedonic Costs,
and the ADA, 94 GEO. L. J. 399, 463 (2004) (emphasizing the union role in the negotiation
process).
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employees requesting accommodations.362
Union representation of employees with disabilities in claims for
accommodations also can have several specific advantages. Unions can be
an important source of information regarding employees’ individual
rights.363 Additionally, unions have access to information relevant to the
claim and can identify and help produce potential witnesses because the
CBA’s just cause provision protects them against retaliation.364 Unions
often can make recommendations for specific accommodations.365
Furthermore, unions can make use of the advantages of being a “repeat
player” in the arbitration process.366
Looking at the rights of the disabled more broadly, negotiation to
clarify and even expand upon available accommodations can be a way to
move beyond the sometimes narrow and often confusing legal parameters
of the duty to accommodate.367 For example, Catherine Albiston notes that
discussing accommodations needs through the union with other employees
may reveal a larger pattern of concerns and allow for a sharing of
knowledge, thus providing greater leverage in negotiations.368
Union involvement in discrimination claims, including requests for
accommodations, may also be important because of the additional
protections against discharge provided in CBAs. Studies of countries with
strong protections against discharge have revealed that employers have a
greater propensity to engage in discrimination in hiring, compared to
countries with weaker protections.369 Without union advocacy against
362. See Sharon Harlan & Pamela Robert, The Social Construction of Disability In
Organizations: Why Employers Resist Reasonable Accommodation, 25 WORK AND
OCCUPATIONS: AN INT’L SOCIOLOGICAL JOURNAL 397, 412 (1998) (discussing the
knowledge-resource differential between employer and employee).
363. See Shannon Gleeson, From Rights to Claims: The Role of Civil Society in Making
Rights Real for Vulnerable Workers, 43 L. & SOC’Y REV. 669, 674 (2009) (discussing the
traditional role of unions as primary advocates for employees).
364. See Hodges, Protecting Unionized Employees, supra note 17, at 166-68 (discussing
union assistance with litigation or voluntary arbitration).
365. Trade Union Action, supra note 231, at 51 (explaining the approach to union work
initially taken by the Public Service Alliance of Canada).
366. Hodges, Protecting Unionized Employees, supra note 17, at 167.
367. See Catherine R. Albiston, Bargaining in the Shadow of Social Institutions:
Competing Discourses and Social Change in Workplace Mobilization of Civil Rights, 39 L.
& SOC’Y REV. 1, 15 (2005) (explaining that law can be a positive force for change but also
may constrain change by “narrowly defining the claims that are possible and by obscuring
other avenues for action.”).
368. Id. at 27 (explaining that social interactions about rights builds solidarity among
workers).
369. Julie C. Suk, Discrimination at Will: Job Security Protections and Equal
Employment Opportunity in Conflict, 60 STAN. L. REV. 73, 76, 95-97 (2007) (discussing
how job security protections have exacerbated racial inequality in France).
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discrimination, there is a stronger likelihood that employers who are
obligated to show just cause will opt to avoid hiring applicants who could
later bring a claim of discrimination.370
Provision of accommodations can be seen as the employer “doing
right,” which can then set a positive tone for addressing other employee
concerns.371 Accommodations can also promote favorable attitudes toward
disability and the ADA, which is good for society at large, and good for the
success of the ADA and the integration of disabled people into the
workplace.372 Barnett should not be interpreted as justification for ignoring
the benefits of providing an accommodation, and only focusing on its costs
to the employer and co-workers. Such an approach would defeat the main
purpose of the ADA—to change stereotypes about the value of including
people with disabilities in the workforce.373
CONCLUSION
People with disabilities continue to struggle with hiring into and
staying employed in “able bodied” workplaces. Employers have been
allowed to deny accommodations for employees with disabilities based on
real or even imagined conflicts with the terms of a CBA. Instead of treating
the CBA as a permanent bar to accommodation, negotiation of the nuances
of providing accommodations to allow greater acceptance into and success
in the workplace can help to fully realize the ADA’s potential for
improving opportunities for people with disabilities. Rather than focusing
on potential conflict between the interests of people with disabilities and
interests of other employees, the collective bargaining relationship can be
an opportunity for both employers and unions to fulfill their obligations
under the ADA.
Bargaining over accommodations can benefit employers, unions, and
employees with disabilities. Negotiation can result in the hiring and
retention of valuable employees with disabilities by identifying
accommodations that best fit a particular work environment. Negotiation
can help employers avoid potential litigation under the ADA and

370. See id. at 107, 113 (acknowledging the difficulties in completely eliminating
employment discrimination); see also Basas, supra note 4, at 75 (noting that employers may
choose to not hire people with disabilities because of uncertainty as to what is a reasonable
accommodation).
371. See Sturm, Designing the Architecture, supra note 294, at 11-16.
372. See Emens, supra note 283, at 843-44, 918 (discussing the costs and benefits of
employee accommodations).
373. See Harris, supra note 66, at 178-79, 182-83 (illustrating how the provision of
accommodations could benefit both the employer and employee).
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contractual claims from other affected employees. For unions, negotiating
about accommodations can help establish value to union members while
limiting the employer’s discretion in making determinations about
accommodations. Negotiation also has the potential to better advance the
interests of employees with disabilities by pushing employers to find
workable and acceptable accommodations that enable employees with
disabilities to be productive members of the workforce.

